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INTRODUCTION 
On November 5, 2014, well-timed to coincide with the G20 
Leaders’ Summit in Australia, the International Consortium of 
Investigative Journalists (“ICIJ”)1 released 28,000 pages of 
confidential documents that it had obtained, allegedly from a former 
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (“PwC”) auditor.2 Antoine Deltour has 
                                                                                                             
* Professor of Law, Eric Byrne Research Fellow, Seton Hall University School of Law. 
B.S., University of Illinois; M.S.T., DePaul University; J.D., Georgetown University Law 
Center. The author received useful comments from the participants at the 2015 Critical Tax 
Conference at Northwestern Law School as well as productive discussions with Robert Peroni, 
Alexander Rust, and Stephen Shay. The author benefitted greatly from a U.S. Fulbright 
Scholar Program grant for a research stay at the University of Luxembourg and the input of 
Werner Haslehner and Fatima Chaouche, as well as the hospitality of the law faculty of the 
University of Luxembourg. The author is also grateful for the financial support of Seton Hall 
University Law School’s Dean’s Research Fellowship program and sabbatical program. The 
author would like to thank her research assistants Adam Suckno, Stephanie Pisko, and Daniel 
Hewitt, as well as the research assistance of Suzanne Larsen and Christian Deprez of the 
University of Luxembourg. 
1.  The ICIJ is a global network of investigative journalists founded in 1997. See About 
the ICIJ, INT’L CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS, www.icij.org/about (last 
visited July 28, 2015). 
2.  Leslie Wayne et al., Leaked Documents Expose Global Companies’ Secret Tax Deals 
in Luxembourg, INT’L CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Nov. 5, 2014, 4:00 
PM), http://www.icij.org/project/luxembourg-leaks/leaked-documents-expose-global-
companies-secret-tax-deals-luxembourg. Subsequent leaks included tax rulings for PepsiCo 
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since received a 12-month suspended prison sentence after having 
been charged with “domestic theft, violation of professional secrecy, 
violation of business secrets, laundering, and fraudulent access to a 
system of automatic data treatment.”3 These documents, known as the 
Luxembourg Leaks or LuxLeaks, comprise the contents of 548 
private tax rulings issued from 2002 to 2010 by the Luxembourg tax 
administration to approximately 340 clients of the public accounting 
firm PwC, including such well-known companies as Amazon, 
Verizon, FedEx, IKEA, Coach, Abbott Laboratories, and Deutsche 
Bank.4 These tax rulings describe complicated financial and legal 
structures that are intended to provide tax savings for the 
multinational companies.5 The press has described these tax rulings as 
“secret tax deals”6 or “sweetheart fiscal deals” arranged for 
multinational companies.7 Luxembourg Finance Minister Pierre 
Gramegna described the LuxLeaks as a “tsunami.”8 
The irony of this situation is obvious when one reads the G20 
Leaders’ Communique from the Brisbane Summit in November 2014: 
                                                                                                             
Inc. and Walt Disney Co. as well as clients of other accounting firms including Deloitte, Ernst 
& Young, and KPMG. See id. For the most recent updates, see Sign up for International 
Consortium of Journalists emails, INT’L CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS, 
https://signup.icij.org/. 
3.  Stephanie Bodoni, Ex-PwC Auditor Charged in Leaks of Luxembourg Tax Cases, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Dec. 15, 2014, 9:17 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-
12-15/ex-pwc-auditor-charged-in-leaks-of-luxembourg-tax-cases (portraying himself as 
Luxembourg’s version of Edward Snowden, Deltour told the French newspaper La Liberation 
that he has “. . . acted according to conviction for my ideas . . . I am just one element in a more 
general movement.”). See also Simon Bowers, LuxLeaks Whistleblower Avoids Jail After 
Guilty Verdict, GUARDIAN (July 29, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/
jun/29/luxleaks-pwc-antoine-deltour-avoids-jail-but-is-convicted-of-theft. 
4.  See Wayne et al., supra note 2; see also Gaspard Sebag, Corporate Tax Deals Across 
EU Face Scrutiny as Probe Widens, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 17, 2014), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-17/sweetheart-tax-deals-across-eu-face-
scrutiny-from-antitrust-arm-i3skpxef. 
5.  See Wayne et al., supra note 2; see also Lee Sheppard, Luxembourg Lubricates 
Income Stripping, 76 TAX NOTES INT’L 851 (2014). 
6.  Wayne et al., supra note 2. 
7.  See Sebag, supra note 4. 
8.  Stephanie Bodoni & Tom Mackenzie, The Quiet Man Who Made Big Trouble for 
Little Luxembourg, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Feb 23, 2015, 4:53 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-23/the-quiet-man-who-made-big-trouble-
for-little-luxembourg (“Luxembourg Finance Minister Pierre Gramegna in November called 
the leaked tax rulings a ‘tsunami’ that ‘totally astonished’ him.”). 
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We are taking actions to ensure the fairness of the international 
tax system and to secure countries’ revenue bases. Profits should 
be taxed where economic activities deriving the profits are 
performed and where value is created. We welcome the 
significant progress on the G20/OECD Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (BEPS) Action Plan to modernize international tax rules. 
We are committed to finalising this work in 2015, including 
transparency of taxpayer-specific rulings found to constitute 
harmful practices.9 
The OECD issued the BEPS report in February 2013.10 Its 
subsequent report in July included an Action Plan of fifteen steps to 
address profit shifting by multinational corporations (“MNCs”).11 The 
OECD’s interim report on countering harmful tax practices 
established the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices (“FHTP”) to focus 
on the improvement of tax transparency, which includes “compulsory 
spontaneous exchange on rulings related to preferential regimes.”12 
The LuxLeaks took this to an extreme, as none of the transparency 
devices being discussed by the FHTP would have released this 
information on rulings to the public. Rather, the focus has been on 
what information should be released to appropriate tax authorities.13 
                                                                                                             
9.  GROUP OF TWENTY [G20], G20 LEADERS’ COMMUNIQUÉ, BRISBANE SUMMIT at 
point 13 (Nov. 2014), https://g20.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/brisbane_g20_leaders_
summit_communique1.pdf (emphasis added) [hereinafter G20 BRISBANE SUMMIT]. 
10.  OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (Feb. 12, 2013), 
http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/addressing-base-erosion-
and-profit-shifting_9789264192744-en#page15 [hereinafter OECD, ADDRESSING BEPS]. This 
BEPS report reviewed various data and studies and found an increased separation between the 
locations of the actual business activities and the reporting of profits for tax purposes. See id. 
at 15. 
11.  OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (July 19, 2013), 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf [hereinafter OECD, BEPS Action Plan]. The 
OECD BEPS Action Plan targets harmful tax practices by establishing a working party on 
aggressive tax planning and by requiring disclosure of aggressive tax planning arrangements. 
See id. at 17 (“Revamp the work on harmful tax practices with a priority on improving 
transparency, including compulsory spontaneous exchange on rulings related to preferential 
regimes . . . “). Id. at 18. See also id. at 21–22. 
12.  OECD, COUNTERING HARMFUL PRACTICES MORE EFFECTIVELY, TAKING INTO 
ACCOUNT TRANSPARENCY AND SUBSTANCE (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/download/2314271e.pdf?expires=1459629786&id=id&accname=guest
&checksum=480CE4987A99A4E06781DD6D8B3005E8 [hereinafter OECD, COUNTERING 
HARMFUL PRACTICES]. 
13.  See id. at 36-46. However, the European Commission has proposed an amendment 
to the Accounting Directive which would require public country-by-country reporting by 
MNCs operating in the EU with global revenues exceeding  EU€750 million a year. See 
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So the real question is: how much tax transparency is appropriate, and 
with whom should the information be exchanged? This article 
discusses certain aspects of the tax transparency issue. 
The MNCs exposed in LuxLeaks are struggling and failing to 
win the public relations war by asserting that they have done nothing 
illegal, and that they have every right to structure their transactions in 
a way that minimizes taxes.14 They have insisted they have a fiduciary 
obligation to their shareholders to take advantage of the favorable tax 
rules that exist in countries like Luxembourg and Ireland. Although 
such private tax rulings are commonplace in most developed 
countries, certain countries in the European Union (such as 
Luxembourg, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Belgium) have had a 
longtime reputation among international tax planners for being 
extremely taxpayer-friendly.15 Luxembourg is particularly distinctive 
considering its former finance minister (1989-1995) and prime 
minister (1995-2013) Jean-Claude Juncker was elected president of 
the European Commission on March 7, 2014, took office on 
November 1, 2014,16 and was subsequently accused of having a 
conflict of interest with respect to the war on tax evasion, “having 
presided over Luxembourg’s development as a corporate tax 
haven.”17 There was even a vote taken on a Motion to Censure in the 
European Parliament on November 26, 2014.18 However, he only 
                                                                                                             
European Commission, Fact Sheet: Introducing Public Country-by-Country Reporting for 
Multinational Enterprises – Questions & Answers, MEMO/16/1351 (Apr. 12, 2016). See also 
infra note 24. 
14.  See, e.g., Hamish Boland Rudder, PwC, Shire Grilled by UK MPs as LuxLeaks 
Response Continues, INT’L CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Dec. 9, 2014, 6:00 
AM), http://www.icij.org/blog/2014/12/pwc-shire-grilled-uk-mps-luxleaks-response-
continues.  
15.  See Kristen A. Parillo, Juncker Survives No-Confidence Vote in European 
Parliament, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY (Dec. 1, 2014), 2014 WTD 230-4 (“But of course we 
were promoting this and we were negotiating with these companies, as others did—the Irish, 
the Dutch, to some extent the Belgians.”). 
16.  See Who is Jean-Claude Juncker?, JEAN-CLAUDE JUNCKER FOR PRESIDENT.COM, 
http://juncker.epp.eu/who-jean-claude-juncker (last visited Mar. 13, 2015). 
17.  Sheppard, supra note 5, at 851; see also Finbarr Bermingham, Lux Leaks: Juncker 
Defends Role in Tax Avoidance as Pressure Mounts on President to Resign, INT’L BUS. TIMES 
(Nov. 12, 2014, 2:28 PM), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/lux-leaks-juncker-defends-role-tax-
avoidance-pressure-mounts-president-resign-1474457. 
18.  See November 2014 EP Plenary Newsletter: Motion of Censure, EU-Canada PNR 
Deal, Digital Single Market, and More, VOTE WATCH EUROPE (Dec. 1, 2014), 
http://www.votewatch.eu/blog/november-2014-ep-plenary-newsletter-motion-of-censure-eu-
canada-pnr-deal-digital-single-market-and-more/#sthash.kNB0r2ha.dpuf. 
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received 101 votes of no confidence (out of 650 votes cast) and 
remains the president of the European Commission.19 
Although Commission President Juncker has publicly stated that 
he was unaware of the rulings practice, he is taking political 
responsibility as the former finance minister in that he should have 
known about his tax administration’s ruling policy.20 He has worked 
diligently to demonstrate that his Commission is doing everything 
possible with respect to combatting tax avoidance and tax evasion 
including facilitating administrative cooperation and encouraging tax 
transparency. On November 12, 2014, he announced that there would 
be an upcoming legal proposal in the form of a draft directive 
regarding the automatic exchange of information on tax rulings from 
Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs, Taxation and 
Customs Pierre Moscovici.21 This proposed directive was released 
March 18, 2015 as part of a Tax Transparency Package,22 and was 
adopted by the Economic and Finance Ministers Council (“ECOFIN”) 
on December 8, 2015.23 A further revision to the Administrative 
Cooperation Directive providing for the automatic exchange of 
information rules on the country-by-country reports of multinational 
companies as of 2017, was released on January 28, 2016 and adopted 
by the Council on May 25, 2016.24 
                                                                                                             
19.  See Parillo, supra note 15. Acceptance of the motion to censure would have also 
required the resignation of President Juncker’s entire twenty-eight member commission. See 
id. 
20.  See Peter Spiegel, Jean-Claude Juncker Regrets Failing to Reform Luxembourg Tax 
Laws, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2014, 3:00 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4b87f3f0-7637-11e4-
a777-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3UIBUoMmY. 
21.  See Stephanie Soong Johnston, European Commission Proposes Automatic 
Information Exchange on Tax Rulings, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY (Nov. 13, 2014), 2014 WTD 
219-3; see also European Commission – Daily News 12/11/2014, MEX/14/1662 (Nov. 12, 
2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEX-14-1662_en.htm. 
22.  See Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Amending Directive 2011/16/EU 
as Regards Mandatory Automatic Exchange of Information in the Field of Taxation, COM 
(2015) 135 final (Mar. 18, 2015) [hereinafter Commission Proposal]. 
23.  See Council Directive 2015/2376 Amending Directive 2011/16/EU as Regards 
Mandatory Exchange of Information in the Field of Taxation, 2015 O.J. L 332/1 [hereinafter 
Directive to Exchange Cross-Border Rulings]. The directive modifies Directive 2011/16/EU as 
amended by Directive 2014/107/EU to require “the automatic exchange of information on 
advance cross-border rulings and advance pricing arrangements.” Id. 
24. Council Directive Amending Directive 2011/16/EU as Regards Mandatory 
Automatic Exchange of Information in the Field of Taxation, (2016/0018) (May 11, 
2016).This implements Action 13 of the OECD Action plan that was endorsed by the G20 to 
fight base erosion and profit shifting. Some members of Parliament wish to go further by 
 
1158 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:1153 
Luxembourg’s assumption of the six-month presidency of the 
Council of the European Union on July 1, 2015 required it to play a 
leadership role with respect to the common agenda, which includes 
“placing EU competitiveness in a global and transparent 
framework.”25 Part II of this Article describes the aftermath of the 
“LuxLeaks scandal” and its effect on the European Union’s policies 
toward the administration of taxes, as well as the European 
Parliament’s formation of a Special Committee on Tax Rulings and 
Other Measures Similar in Nature or Effect (“TAXE Committee”).26   
Even before the LuxLeaks scandal, Luxembourg was working 
hard to overcome the “public perception of Luxembourg as a shady 
financial centre” and its reputation as a “tax haven.”27 Luxembourg, 
instead of exchanging information automatically under the EU 
Savings Directive, was only obliged to levy a withholding tax at a rate 
of thirty-five percent under a negotiated transition rule.28 This 
transition rule allowed the Luxembourg banks to apply a withholding 
tax to the savings income without having to divulge details on 
individual clients or their income earned to the tax authorities. 
However, Luxembourg began participating in the automatic exchange 
of information within the European Union as of January 1, 2015.29 
This change of position was necessary because Luxembourg 
agreed to share information with the United States pursuant to an 
                                                                                                             
requiring that some of this information be made public. Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards 
disclosures of income tax information by certain undertakings and branches, COM (2016) 198 
final (April 12, 2016). 
25.  A Union for the citizens, Priorities of the Luxembourg Presidency, GRAND DUCHY 
OF LUX., http://www.eu2015lu.eu/fr/la-presidence/a-propos-presidence/programme-et-priorites
/index.html (“The Luxembourg Presidency aims to successfully conclude negotiations on the 
proposal on transparency and exchange of information regarding tax rulings.”) (emphasis in 
original). 
26.  See infra Part II. 
27.  Luxembourg Praised by OECD Peer Review, LUX. FOR FIN. (Sept. 13, 2011), 
http://www.luxembourgforfinance.com/fr/news/luxembourg-praised-oecd-peer-review. 
Luxembourg for Finance is a quasi-governmental agency. 
28.  Council Directive 2003/48/EC on Taxation of Savings Income in the Form of 
Interest Payments, 2003 O.J. L 157/38, art. 11 at 43 (regarding the taxation of savings 
income). 
29.  Prime Minister Juncker announced this change in his annual State of the Nation 
speech in April 2013. Ministère des finances Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, FAQ: Introducing 
automatic exchange of information in Luxembourg, http://mf.public.lu/actualites/2013/04/
faq_aut_exchange_1004131/index.html. 
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intergovernmental agreement negotiated on account of the Foreign 
Account Tax Compliance Act (“FATCA”).30 Furthermore, in July 
2013, the G20 finance ministers unanimously endorsed the OECD’s 
proposal for a global model for multilateral automatic exchange of tax 
information known as the Common Reporting Standard (“CRS”)31 
and committed “to automatic exchange of information as the new, 
global standard.”32 On July 30, 2015, Luxembourg approved 
legislation that would introduce CRS as of January 1, 2017, reporting 
on calendar year 2016.33 As detailed in Part I, Luxembourg also 
agreed to the adoption of the new “European FATCA” at the 
ECOFIN meeting that took place in Luxembourg in October 2014.34 
Luxembourg also participates in the Global Forum on 
Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes 
(“Global Forum”), which monitors the OECD work being done on tax 
transparency and exchange of information.35 After receiving a rating 
                                                                                                             
30.  See Luxembourg Moving Towards Enhanced Cooperation in Taxation and 
Exchange of Information, ERNST & YOUNG (July 2013), http://www.ey.com/Publication/
vwLUAssets/EYe_on_Luxembourg_tax_-_Luxembourg_moving_towards_enhanced_
cooperation_in_taxation_and_exchange_of_information/$FILE/Luxembourg-moving-towards-
enhanced-cooperation-in-taxation-and-exchange-of-information.pdf. One interesting 
innovation in the Administrative Cooperation Directive was the addition of a most-favored-
nation clause such that no Member State may refuse to extend its wider cooperation 
arrangements with third countries to another “Member State wishing to enter into such mutual 
wider cooperation.” Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on Concrete Ways to Reinforce the Fight against Tax Fraud and Tax Evasion 
including in Relation to Third Countries, at 7, COM (2012) COM 351 final (June 27, 2012) 
[hereinafter Communication on Tax Evasion]. Thus, legally any Member State has the right to 
demand from another Member State the same level of cooperation that is being provided to the 
United States. 
31.  See OECD, STANDARD FOR AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNT 
INFORMATION (2013), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/automatic-
exchange-financial-account-information-common-reporting-standard.pdf [hereinafter OECD, 
AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNT INFORMATION]. 
32.  GROUP OF 20 [G20], COMMUNIQUÉ MEETING OF FINANCE MINISTERS AND 
CENTRAL BANK GOVERNORS MOSCOW at point 19 (July 19-20, 2013), https://g20.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/Final_Communique_FM_July_ENG.pdf [hereinafter G20 MOSCOW] 
(noting that Luxembourg is a member of the OECD and is represented in the G20 by the 
European Union). 
33.  See Ann M. Miller, Luxembourg Approves Bill on Automatic Exchange of Financial 
Information, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY (Aug. 4, 2015), 2015 WTD 149-10. 
34.  See infra Part I. 
35. See OECD, THE GLOBAL FORUM OF TRANSPARENCY AND EXCHANGE OF 
INFORMATION FOR TAX PURPOSES: INFORMATION BRIEF 2 (2013), http://www.oecd.org/
tax/transparency/global_forum_background%20brief.pdf [hereinafter OECD, GLOBAL 
FORUM]. 
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of “Non-Compliant” after its Global Forum peer review in October 
2013, Luxembourg set out to implement reforms.36 As detailed in Part 
I, Luxembourg has undergone a radical transformation from a vocal 
proponent of banking secrecy to an early adopter of the global 
standard for automatic exchange of financial account information 
developed by the OECD (working closely with the G20 and the 
European Union). One piece of evidence of this transformation is the 
signing of a Model I Intergovernmental FATCA Agreement 
(“FATCA IGA”) with the United States on March 28, 2014.37 This 
agreement requires Luxembourg financial institutions to report the 
required information on US account holders to the Luxembourg tax 
administration, which will then exchange the information with the 
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). 
The United States, on the other hand, while pledging reciprocity 
with respect to the exchange of information, is unable to even ratify 
the 2009 Protocol amending the US-Luxembourg Tax Treaty to 
provide for the then current OECD “foreseeably relevant” standard 
for exchange of information.38 As the amended Article 28 (“Exchange 
of Information”) is the legal basis for automatic exchange of 
information pursuant to the agreement, ratification of the Protocol by 
the United States was originally considered to be necessary before the 
Luxembourg-US FATCA IGA could enter into force.39 Furthermore, 
while fifty-four countries (early adopters of CRS) have pledged to 
                                                                                                             
36.  See OECD, GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY AND EXCHANGE OF 
INFORMATION FOR TAX PURPOSES PEER REVIEWS: LUXEMBOURG 2013: PHASE 2: 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STANDARD PRACTICE 10 (2013), http://dx.doi.org/
10.1787/9789264202672-en [hereinafter OECD, LUXEMBOURG 2013 REVIEW]. 
37.  See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg to Improve International Tax Compliance 
and with Respect to The U.S. Information Reporting Provisions Commonly Known as the 
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, U.S.-Lux, Mar. 28, 2014, T.I.A.S. No. 15-729.1, 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-Agreement-
Luxembourg-3-28-2014.pdf [hereinafter Luxembourg-US FATCA IGA]. 
38.  See Protocol Amending the Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with 
Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Lux., May 20, 2009, S. Treaty Doc. NO. 111-8 (2009); 
Patricia Zengerle, Senate Panel Approves Eight International Tax Treaties, REUTERS (Nov. 
10, 2015, 10:18 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-tax-treaties-idUSKCN0S
Z1YD20151110. The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the tax treaties with 
Switzerland, Luxembourg, Hungary, Chile, Spain, Poland, Japan, and the Convention on 
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters on November 10, 2015. As of August 7, 
2016, these treaties were still awaiting approval by the full Senate. 
39. See infra notes 121-22. 
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exchange information on financial accounts in 2017 and another 
forty-seven jurisdictions will begin this exchange in 2018,40 the 
United States has not committed to participate in this global automatic 
exchange of information.41 This article discusses the consequences of 
these significant events. 
I. AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION 
Banking secrecy was a well-established tradition in 
Luxembourg, dating back to the “French Penal Code of 1791 as 
subsequently amended by Luxembourg Parliament in 1879.”42 
Parliament also made the banking secrecy rules “part of Luxembourg 
public policy provisions,” such that any breach “constitutes a criminal 
offence subject to a fine and an imprisonment.”43 The first exceptions 
to banking secrecy were part of anti-money laundering legislation that 
required the banks to cooperate with any official investigation as well 
as to report any suspicious activities of their clients. Although the 
Luxembourg law was originally limited to the financial aspects of 
organized crime (i.e, drug money), the list of criminal activities was 
expanded to include financial crimes such as corruption in 2004.44 
                                                                                                             
40.  OECD, SECRETARY GENERAL REPORT TO G20 FINANCE MINISTERS AND CENTRAL 
BANK GOVERNORS: WASHINGTON D.C. 14 (April 2015), http://www.oecd.org/
tax/transparency/2015-April-GF-report-G20.pdf [hereinafter OECD, REPORT TO G20]. For the 
complete list of countries, see OECD, AEOI: STATUS OF COMMITMENTS (101 JURISDICTIONS 
HAVE COMMITTED) (July 26, 2016), http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/AEOI-
commitments.pdf (last visited August 7, 2016) [hereinafter OECD, AEOI: STATUS OF 
COMMITMENTS]. 
41.  See OECD, REPORT TO G20, supra note 40, at 13 n.2. The United States’ position 
with respect to the global automatic exchange of information is that it will pursue automatic 
information exchanges beginning in 2015 through FATCA, which includes reliance on 
intergovernmental agreements (IGAs), such as the Model 1A IGAs. This specific type of IGA 
“acknowledge[s] the need for the United States to achieve equivalent levels of reciprocal 
automatic information exchange with partner jurisdictions.” Id. Furthermore, the Model 1A 
IGAs incorporate “a political commitment to pursue the adoption of regulations and to 
advocate and support relevant legislation to achieve such equivalent levels of reciprocal 
automatic exchange.” Id. 
42.  Alain Steichen, New Exchange of Information Versus Tax Solutions of Equivalent 
Effect- Luxembourg Report, EUR. ASS’N OF TAX LAW PROFESSORS, at 2, 
http://www.eatlp.org/uploads/public/2014/National%20report%20Luxembourg.pdf at 2; see 
also id. at 3 (stating that the banking bills of 1981 and 1993 “took great care in indicating that 
the specific bank secrecy merely was confirming for financial institutions the already existing 
rules.”). 
43.  Id. 
44.  See id. 
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However, because the tax administration has no access to any 
information that results from anti-money laundering investigations, 
the tax administration was unable to exchange such information with 
foreign tax authorities.45 
The Luxembourg Tax Code was amended in 1989 to ensure that 
the tax administration was not allowed access to any financial 
information from the banks regarding taxpayers. If Luxembourg did 
not have access to this data for its resident taxpayers, the tax authority 
also did not have this information to exchange with foreign tax 
authorities under the relevant tax treaty.46 Article 26 §3 of the Model 
OECD Double Tax Convention on Income and Capital previously 
stated that a country is not bound to go beyond its own domestic laws 
in exchanging information with its treaty partner.47 The Luxembourg 
Tax Code also distinguished simple tax evasion, where the tax 
authorities may not lift bank secrecy, from aggravated tax fraud, 
where the public prosecutor has the power to do so.48 But even tax 
fraud still precluded information exchange under any of 
Luxembourg’s tax treaties because “the information exchange only 
involves the tax authorities of the respective treaty partners” and there 
is no “exchange of information between the public prosecutor and the 
tax authorities within Luxembourg.”49 
Progress toward administrative cooperation was accelerated by 
the global financial crisis that highlighted the need for more exchange 
of information to combat tax avoidance and tax evasion.50 In February 
of 2009, the European Commission proposed a new Council Directive 
on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation, which set up 
                                                                                                             
45.  See id. at 3-4. 
46.  See Alain Steichen, Information Exchange in Tax Matters: Luxembourg’s New Tax 
Policy in EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND BANK SECRECY 12 (Alexander Rust & Eric Fort 
eds., 2012). 
47.   OECD, ARTICLES OF THE MODEL CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON 
INCOME AND ON CAPITAL art. 26 (Jan. 28, 2003), http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/1914467
.pdf (“In no case shall the provisions of paragraph 1 and 2 be construed so as to impose on a 
Contracting State the obligation: . . . to supply information which is not obtainable under the 
laws . . . of that . . . Contracting State . . . .”). 
48.  See Steichen, supra note 46, at 12; see also id. (noting that tax fraud is an extreme 
form of tax evasion involving sophisticated strategies, payment chains, and certain monetary 
amounts.). 
49.  Id. at 12-13. 
50.  See generally Irma Johanna Mosquera Valderrama, EU and OECD Proposals for 
International Tax Cooperation: A New Road?, 59 TAX NOTES INT’L 609 (2010). 
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procedures, scope, and conditions for the exchange of information on 
request, the automatic exchange of information, the spontaneous 
exchange of information, and administrative notification among 
Member States as well as between Member States and third 
countries.51 One goal was to implement the 2005 revision of the 
OECD Standard on exchange of information that is set forth in 
paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 26 of the OECD Model Convention.52 
This revision requires each party to use its powers to obtain and 
provide such information even if it is not needed for its own domestic 
tax purposes and even if it is held by a financial institution.53 Initially, 
Luxembourg, as well as Austria, Belgium, and Switzerland, entered 
reservations with respect to this change.54 
Due to increased pressure by the Global Forum, Luxembourg 
committed itself in 2009 to this global standard of transparency and 
exchange of information on request of all “foreseeably relevant” tax 
information that was adopted by OECD in 2005.55 Luxembourg also 
negotiated new tax treaties and protocols in order to incorporate the 
2005 revised version of Article 26 of the OECD Model Convention, 
including the Protocol with the United States.56 Luxembourg is party 
to exchange of information agreements with over seventy-five 
jurisdictions through the use of double taxation conventions.57 These 
include almost all of the OECD and G20 countries as well as all 
                                                                                                             
51.  See Proposal for a Council Directive on Administrative Cooperation in the Field of 
Taxation: Communication from the Commission, COM (2009) 29 Final (Feb. 2, 2009). 
52.   See Council of the European Union Press Release: Economic and Financial Affairs, 
10737/09 (Presse 168), (June 9, 2009), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/
docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/108392.pdf. 
53.  See OECD, UPDATE TO ARTICLE 26 OF THE OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION AND 
ITS COMMENTARY art. 26(4) (2012), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/
120718_Article%2026-ENG_no%20cover%20(2).pdf [hereinafter OECD, MODEL TAX 
CONVENTION] (“If information is requested by a Contracting State . . . the other Contracting 
State shall use its information gathering measures to obtain the requested information, even 
though that other State may not need such information for its own tax purposes . . . .”); see 
also id. art. 26(5) (“In no case shall the provision of paragraph 3 be construed to permit a 
Contracting State to decline to supply information solely because the information is held by a 
bank, other financial institution . . .”). 
54.  See Steichen, supra note 46, at 15. 
55.  Werner Haslehner, Luxembourg: The Standard of “Foreseeable Relevance”, in 
TAX TREATY CASE LAW AROUND THE GLOBE 323 (E. Kemmeren et al. eds., 2014). 
56.  See OECD, LUXEMBOURG 2013 REVIEW, supra note 36, at 7. 
57.  See Administration des Contributions Directes du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, 
Conventions en vigueur, http://www.impotsdirects.public.lu/conventions/conv_vig/index.html 
(last updated March 10, 2016). 
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major trading partners (Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
and the United Kingdom).58 
Another major improvement to the OECD Model in 2005 was to 
override banking secrecy; bank secrecy was no longer allowed to 
serve as a reason for categorical refusal to exchange information.59 
This change required Luxembourg to pass legislation in 2010 that 
granted access to banking information and other information 
previously protected by secrecy rules.60 A Grand Ducal regulation 
adopted on February 1, 2010 prescribes rules with respect to 
information on numbered accounts.61 Nevertheless, Luxembourg’s 
restrictive judiciary has at times upheld the “domestic standard for 
bank secrecy and taxpayer protection.”62 The Global Forum labeled 
Luxembourg “Non-Compliant” with respect to this restrictive 
interpretation of the “foreseeably relevant” standard.63 To rectify this 
state of affairs, Luxembourg passed legislation that clarifies that the 
tax administration is only allowed to verify “the formal legality of the 
information request.”64 The Global Forum also criticized Luxembourg 
for disclosing to taxpayers information about exchange of information 
(“EOI”) requests, as it considers this to not be “in accordance with the 
principle that the information contained in an EOI request should be 
kept confidential.”65 The Luxembourg legislation also precludes the 
                                                                                                             
58.  See id. 
59.  See OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 53, art. 26(5) (“In no case shall 
the provisions of paragraph 3 be construed to permit a Contracting State to decline to supply 
information solely because the information is held by a bank, other financial institution . . . .”). 
60.  See OECD, LUXEMBOURG 2013 REVIEW, supra note 36, at 8. 
61.  OECD, GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION 
FOR TAX PURPOSES PEER REVIEWS: LUXEMBOURG 2011: PHASE 1: LEGAL AND REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK (2011), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264117884-en [hereinafter OECD, 
LUXEMBOURG 2011 REVIEW]. 
62.  Haslehner, supra note 55, at 331. 
63.  Id. at 332 (“Luxembourg has interpreted the foreseeably relevant standard in an 
unduly restrictive way resulting in information not being exchanged in some cases.”); see also 
id. (citing OECD, LUXEMBOURG 2013 REVIEW, supra note 36). 
64.  See Haslehner, supra note 55, at 332. 
65.  OECD, LUXEMBOURG 2013 REVIEW, supra note 36; see also OECD, KEEPING IT 
SAFE: THE OECD GUIDE ON THE PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION 
EXCHANGED FOR TAX PURPOSES (2012), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchangeofinformation/
Keeping%20it%20Safe_EN%20FINAL%20w_cover_WEB.pdf. 
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financial institutions from notifying their clients regarding the EOI 
request.66 
In 2011, the EU Council finally adopted the Directive on 
Administrative Cooperation in the field of taxation (“DAC”).67 The 
2011 DAC generally became effective January 1, 201368 and allows 
the information to be “used for the administration and enforcement of 
the domestic [tax] laws” as well as associated “judicial and 
administrative proceedings.”69 Member States must provide the 
required information within certain time limits (two months for 
information they already possess and six months for other 
information70) and are obligated to provide the information even if 
they do not need it for their own tax purposes and even if held by a 
bank or other financial institution.71 This means that Member States 
cannot justify refusing to provide information on the basis of their 
banking secrecy laws.72 
Commentators note that the Directive’s articles on exchange of 
information on request conceivably go beyond the OECD Standard in 
its obligation to transmit any “information that is foreseeably relevant 
to the administration and enforcement of the domestic [tax] laws” 
because the requirements for a valid request are less onerous than 
those in the OECD Model Agreement on the Exchange of Information 
on Tax Matters.73 The most important feature, however, was the 
extension of the mandatory automatic exchange of information that 
existed with respect to savings income to income from employment, 
director’s fees, certain life insurance products, pensions, and 
                                                                                                             
66.  See Werner Haslehner, Luxembourg: Disclosure of Information Requests by the 
Court, in TAX TREATY CASE LAW AROUND THE GLOBE, supra note 55, at 347-48; see also 
Recueil De Legislation, MEMORIAL JOURNAL OFFICIEL DU GRAND-DUCHÉ DE 
LUXEMBOURG, du 25 novembre 2014 at 4170, http://www.impotsdirects.public.lu/
legislation/legi14/Memorial-A—-N_-214-du-27-novembre-2014.pdf (on file with author). 
67.  See Council Directive 2011/16/EU on Administrative Cooperation in the Field of 
Taxation and Repealing Directive 77/799/EEC, 2011 O.J. L 64/1 [hereinafter 2011 DAC]. 
68.  See id. art. 29 § 1. 
69.  Id. art. 16 § 1. 
70.  See id. art. 7 § 1. 
71.  See id. art. 18 § 1. 
72.  See Marius Vascega & Servaas van Thiel, Assessment of Taxes in Cross-Border 
Situations: The New EU Directive on Administrative Cooperation in the Field of Taxation, 20 
EC TAX REV. 148, 152 (2011). 
73.  See id. at 152–53; see also 2011 DAC, supra note 67, arts. 1 § 1, 24 § 1. 
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immovable property, to the extent that information is available.74 As 
described infra, further steps have been taken with the revisions made 
to the Directive in 2014.75 The article prescribing the automatic 
exchange of information took effect January 1, 2015 and covers tax 
periods beginning January 1, 2014.76 As with all directives in the tax 
area, this required unanimous consent by all EU Member States. 
It is generally understood that the automatic exchange of 
information is the most effective way to fight tax evasion. Thus, the 
Directive provided that automatic information exchange may be 
extended to other categories of income (such as dividends, capital 
gains, and royalties) in the future.77 One interesting innovation in the 
2011 DAC was the addition of a most-favored-nation clause such that 
no Member State may refuse to extend its wider cooperation 
arrangements with third countries to another “Member State wishing 
to enter into such mutual wider cooperation.”78 Legally, any Member 
State has the right to demand from another Member State the same 
level of cooperation that is being provided to the United States.79 
Thus, the FATCA IGA that Luxembourg negotiated with the United 
States necessitated increased cooperation within the European Union. 
During 2014, amazing progress was made with respect to tax 
transparency compared to what transpired earlier. The US FATCA 
legislation was enacted in 201080 to enlist foreign financial 
institutions to report directly to the IRS certain information about 
financial accounts held by US taxpayers or by foreign entities in 
which US taxpayers hold a substantial ownership interest.81 The US 
FATCA project had seemed doomed to failure as foreign financial 
institutions testified to the extreme costs of compliance at an IRS 
                                                                                                             
74.  See 2011 DAC, supra note 67, art. 8. 
75.  See infra notes 235-46 and accompanying text. 
76.  See 2011 DAC, supra note 67, arts. 8 § 1, 29 § 1. 
77.  See id. at pmbl. ¶ 10, art. 8 § 5; see also Communication on Tax Evasion, supra 
note 30. 
78.  2011 DAC, supra note 67, at pmbl. ¶ 22; see also Valderrama, supra note 50, at 
614. 
79.  See Communication on Tax Evasion, supra note 30, at 10. 
80.  Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, § 501–35, 124 
Stat. 71, 97–115 (2010). Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) added sections 1471 
to 1474 to the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.). For further history of FATCA, see Tracy Kaye, 
Innovations in the War on Tax Evasion, 2014 BYU L. REV. 363 (2014); Itai Grinberg, The 
Battle over Taxing Offshore Accounts, 60 UCLA L. REV. 304 (2012). 
81.  See  I.R.C. § 1471(b) (2015). 
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public hearing, expressing concerns over the complexity of the 
regulations and pleading for delays of the various effective dates.82 
For example, a survey done in 2014 by the Luxembourg Bankers’ 
Association (“ABBL”) and Ernst & Young (“EY”) on the financial 
implications of FATCA to the Luxembourg Banks found that the total 
budget for implementing FATCA averaged EU€792,000 per 
institution, ranging from EU€2.4 million to EU€143,000, depending 
on the size of the bank.83 Representatives of foreign governments 
ranging from Australia to Japan highlighted the foreign legal 
impediments to FATCA implementation and also pleaded for more 
time.84 The IRS complied and announced later implementation dates 
for the due diligence and documentation procedures as well as the 
reporting requirements under FATCA on multiple occasions.85 
FATCA also required US taxpayers holding specified foreign 
financial assets with an aggregate value exceeding US$50,000 
offshore on the last day of the tax year (or more than US$75,000 at 
any time) to report those assets to the IRS on Form 8938 beginning 
with their 2011 tax return.86 Failure to report foreign financial assets 
results in a penalty of US$10,000 (and a penalty of up to US$50,000 
                                                                                                             
82.  See Shamik Trivedi, Bank Representatives Seek Delay of FATCA Regs, 66 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 695 (2012). 
83.  See Serge de Cillia, Denis Costermans, Olivier Maréchal, & Benoît Sauvage, 
Survey on the cost of regulation and its impact on the Luxembourg financial market place, 
ERNST & YOUNG (2014), http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Survey_on_the_
cost_of_regulation_and_its_impact_on_the_Luxembourg_financial_marketplace/$File/Cost-
of-regulation-survey_ABBL-EY_September-2014.pdf. Extrapolating “to the Luxembourg 
market, the global FATCA budget is [EU€] 74 million . . ." Id. at 21. Forty-six out of 150 
banks in the Luxembourg financial market responded to a detailed questionnaire on the costs 
and investments required by FATCA. This sample was particularly representative in that with 
respect to “type of activity, size, balance sheet total, net banking income or number of 
employees, coverage range[d] between 37% and 50%.” Id. at 4. 
84.  See Financial Institutions: Witnesses Urge IRS to Give Banks More Time to Comply 
with FATCA, Air Many Concerns, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), May 16, 2012, at GG-1. 
85.  See e.g., I.R.S Announcement 2012-42, 2012-47 I.R.B. 561 (Timeline for Due 
Diligence and Other Requirements Under FATCA); I.R.S. Notice 2013-43, 2013-31 I.R.B. 
113, 114. (Revised Timeline and Other Guidance Regarding the Implementation of FATCA). 
86.  I.R.C. § 6038D(a) (2015). Treas. Reg. §1.6038D-2(a) doubles these thresholds for 
individuals filing married or filing jointly. The threshold for a taxpayer living abroad is 
$200,000. Form 8938 is used to report the total value of all specified foreign financial assets 
including foreign stock or securities not held in a financial account as well as investment 
vehicles such as foreign hedge funds and foreign private equity funds. See Form 8938, 
Statement of Specified Foreign Assets, IRS (2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8938.pdf. 
See also Instructions for Form 8938, IRS (2015), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i8938.pdf. 
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for continued failure after IRS notification).87 Millions of Americans 
living abroad were outraged.88 Senator Mike Lee from Utah traveled 
to an American Chamber of Commerce luncheon in Luxembourg in 
the fall of 2014 in order to assure these US citizens that he would be 
working hard to get FATCA repealed.89 However, FATCA has 
greatly contributed to the success of the IRS’s Offshore Voluntary 
Disclosure Programs (“OVDP”) that have been in place since 2009 to 
allow US taxpayers to disclose overseas assets and pay reduced 
penalties.90 By 2015, over 54,000 taxpayers had participated and 
approximately US$8 billion was collected from these voluntary 
disclosures.91 
Senator Rand Paul has reintroduced his bill to repeal FATCA (A 
Bill to Repeal the Violation of Sovereign Nations’ Laws and Privacy 
Matters),92 which is co-sponsored by Senator Wicker.93 Furthermore, 
on July 14, 2015, Senator Paul filed a lawsuit with members of 
                                                                                                             
87.  See I.R.C. § 6038D(d). Underpayments of tax attributable to non-disclosed foreign 
financial assets will be subject to an additional substantial understatement penalty of forty 
percent. See Instructions for Form 8938, supra note 86. 
88.  See AMERICAN CITIZENS ABROAD, https://americansabroad.org (last visited Mar. 
13, 2015); James George Jatras, American Citizens Abroad Blasts FATCA In Comment To 
House Working Groups, Calls For Repeal As Part Of Tax Reform Framework, REPEAL 
FACTA, http://www.repealfatca.com/index.asp?idmenu=4&idsubmenu=121&title=american-
citizens-abroad-blasts-fatca-in-comment-to-house-working-groups-calls-for-repeal-as-part-of-
tax-reform-framework (last visited Aug. 10, 2016). 
89.  See Summary of ANTI-FATCA U.S. Congressional Visit to Luxembourg, with 
Senator Mike Lee, AM. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN LUX., http://www.amcham.lu/
photos/2014/summary-of-anti-fatca-us-congressional-visit-to-luxembourg-with-senator-mike-
lee/. 
90.  See I.R.S. News Release IR-2014-73 (June 18, 2014), 
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-Makes-Changes-to-Offshore-Programs. There are 
multiple programs that taxpayers may participate in so as “to come into compliance with their 
U.S. tax obligations” including OVDP, Streamlined programs, Transitional Relief and 
Delinquent FBAR). See Robert Wood, Offshore Accounts? Choose OVDP or Streamlined 
Despite Fatca, FORBES (June 30, 2015, 9:42 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
robertwood/2015/06/30/offshore-accounts-choose-ovdp-or-streamlined-despite-
fatca/#554d8560a14c8. 
91.  See I.R.S., News Release IR-2015-116 (Oct. 16, 2015), https://www.irs.gov/uac/
newsroom/offshore-compliance-programs-generate-8-billion-irs-urges-people-to-take-
advantage-of-voluntary-disclosure-programs. 
92.  See S. 663, 114th Cong. (2015); see also Sen. Rand Paul Introduces Bill to Repeal 
Anti-Privacy Provisions in FATCA, RAND PAUL (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.paul.senate.gov/
news/press/sen-rand-paul-introduces-bill-to-repeal-anti-privacy-provisions-in-fatca. 
93.  See S.663 A Bill to Repeal the Violation of Sovereign Nations’ Laws and Privacy 
Matters, US CONGRESS, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/663/
cosponsors (last visited June 17, 2015). 
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Republican Overseas Action94 in the US District Court for the 
Southern District of Ohio that challenged the constitutionality of 
FATCA, stating: 
FATCA eschews the privacy rights enshrined in the Bill of 
Rights in favor of efficiency and compliance by requiring 
institutions to report citizens’ account information to the IRS 
even when the IRS has no reason to suspect that a particular 
taxpayer is violating the tax laws.95 
The petition also challenges President Obama’s constitutional 
power to make international agreements because they override 
FATCA and exceed the scope of the President’s independent 
constitutional powers.96 Other claims were that the increased 
“reporting requirements for foreign financial accounts deny US 
citizens living abroad the equal protection of the laws.”97 However, 
the IRS regulations finalized in 201398 provided for increased 
thresholds for taxpayers living abroad of US$200,000 on the last day 
of the tax year (or more than US$300,000 at any time) for single 
taxpayers.99 
The US District Court for the Southern District of Ohio denied 
the FATCA plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunctive relief based 
on a lack of standing, determining that only one of the seven plaintiffs 
had standing.100 The court held that the equal protection challenge to 
the increased reporting requirements for foreign financial accounts for 
Americans living abroad failed because the statute applies to all US 
                                                                                                             
94.  William R. Davis & Andrew Velarde, Sen. Paul Files Lawsuit Challenging FATCA, 
79 TAX NOTES INT’L 226 (2015) (“Republicans Overseas Action, a political organization that 
represents the interests of U.S. Republicans who live abroad.”). 
95.  Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Crawford v. United 
States Department of the Treasury (S.D. Ohio 2015) (No. 15-250) 2015 WL 567552 
[hereinafter Crawford v. United States complaint]; see also Davis & Velarde, supra note 94. 
96.  For previous discussions of the controversy over the legal status of IGAs, see 
Allison Christians, Putting the Reign Back in Sovereign, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1373, 1404 (2013) 
(arguing that presenting IGAs “as diplomatic agreements…represents a significant expansion 
of the competent authority’s interpretive role….”); see also the response by Susan Morse, Why 
FATCA Intergovernmental Agreements Bind the U.S. Government, 70 TAX NOTES INT’L 245 
(2013). 
97.  Crawford v. United States complaint, supra note 95, at *40. 
98.  See T.D. 9610, 2013-41 I.R.B. 322. 
99.  Treas. Reg. §1.6038D-2(a) doubles these thresholds for individuals filing married or 
filing jointly to US$400,000 and US$600,000, respectively. 
100.  See Crawford v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury (S.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2015), (No. 3:15-
CV-250), 2015 WL 5697552, at *11, *16. 
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citizens with offshore accounts regardless of residence.101 
Furthermore, the court held that the statute is rationally related to the 
legitimate state interest of addressing offshore tax evasion.102 
Of the approximately 187,000 Form 8938s filed with the 2012 
tax returns, only twenty-one percent were submitted with a foreign 
address.103 Nevertheless, FATCA is being blamed for an increase in 
the number of Americans who are renouncing their citizenship.104 In 
2013, approximately 3,000 individuals renounced their citizenship or 
gave up their green cards, a significant increase over the 932 
individuals who did so in 2012.105 Another 3,415 renunciations took 
place in 2014106 and 4,729 in 2015,107 but keep in mind that there are 
approximately 8.7 million Americans living abroad.108 It is true that 
FATCA has probably increased awareness of the US tax filing 
obligations of US citizens and tax residents living abroad due to the 
US tax rules requiring worldwide taxation of such individuals.109 
FATCA has also caused a renewed reexamination of this tax policy of 
worldwide taxation of nonresident US citizens and green card 
holders.110 
                                                                                                             
101.  Id. at *13. 
102.  Id. The U.S. District Court also dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction on 
April 25, 2016. See 2016 WTD 82-24 (April 26, 2016). 
103.  See TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERVICE, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 240 
(2013), http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2013-Annual-Report/downloads/Volume-1.pdf. 
104.  See Caroline May, Record Total Number US Taxpayers Renounce Citizenship in 
2013, DAILY CALLER (Feb. 9, 2014, 2:51 PM), http://dailycaller.com/2014/02/09/record-total-
number-u-s-taxpayers-renounce-citizenship-in-2013/. 
105.  See id.; see also Laura Saunders, The New Rules of Offshore Accounts, WALL ST. 
J. (June 5, 2015, 9:41 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-rules-of-offshore-accounts-
1433511676 [hereinafter Saunders, The New Rules of Offshore Accounts]. 
106.  See Quarterly Publication of Individuals, Who Have Chosen to Expatriate, as 
Required by Section 6039G, 80 Fed. Reg. 7685 (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-02-11/pdf/2015-02850.pdf. 
107.  See Quarterly Publication of Individuals, Who Have Chosen to Expatriate, as 
Required by Section 6039G, 81 Fed. Reg. 6598 (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/FR-2016-02-08/pdf/2016-02312.pdf. 
108.  See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BY THE NUMBERS: PASSPORTS, 
INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL, VISAS (May 20, 2015), http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/
travel/CA%20by%20the%20Numbers-%20May%202015.pdf; see also Saunders, The New 
Rules of Offshore Accounts, supra note 105. 
109.  See Andrew Mitchel & Ryan E. Dunn, 2013 Expatriations Increase by 221%, 
INT’L TAX BLOG (Feb. 6, 2014), http://intltax.typepad.com/intltax_blog/2014/02/2013-
expatriations-increase-by-___.html. 
110.  See generally Ruth Mason, Citizenship Taxation, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 101 (2016); 
see also Michael S. Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 481 
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Regardless, on July 1, 2014, FATCA went into effect with 
respect to the registration requirements for the foreign financial 
institutions (“FFIs”). By mid-2016, over 200,000 financial institutions 
had registered through the IRS FATCA Registration System.111 
Financial institutions and host country tax authorities will use the 
International Data Exchange Service to provide the IRS with 
information reports on financial accounts held by US persons.112 FFIs 
registered with the IRS in order to begin reporting financial 
information on their US account holders in 2015 with respect to 2014 
tax information.113 Failure to comply with this regime could expose 
the financial institutions to thirty percent withholding on any US 
source investment income.114 
Many more FFIs are governed instead by intergovernmental 
agreements (“IGAs”) negotiated by their governments with the United 
States.115 This intergovernmental approach, Treasury Model I, allows 
                                                                                                             
(2007) (“[I]t is reasonable to conclude that the retention of U.S. citizenship reflects . . . the 
belief that the benefits of citizenship are worth the tax cost.”); but see Edward Zelinsky, 
Citizenship and Worldwide Taxation: Citizenship as an Administrable Proxy for Domicile, 96 
IOWA L. REV. 1289, 1349 (2011) (concluding that the worldwide taxation of U.S. citizens is 
not justified by the psychological benefits of U.S. citizenship); Michael DeBlis, III, Are the 
Psychological Benefits of U.S. Citizenship an Adequate Justification for the Worldwide 
Taxation of Nonresident U.S. Citizens?, TAX CONNECTIONS (Jan. 21, 2015), 
http://www.taxconnections.com/taxblog/update-to-comments-are-the-psychological-benefits-
of-u-s-citizenship-an-adequate-justification-for-the-worldwide-taxation-of-nonresident-u-s-
citizens/#.VQW840bOVU4 (stating the existence of psychological benefits as a result of U.S. 
citizenship is a “myth”). 
111.  See Letter from Jacob J. Lew, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, to Paul D. Ryan, 
Speaker, U.S. H.R. (May 5, 2016) (on file with U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury); see also FATCA 
Foreign Financial Institution (FFI) List Search and Download Tool, IRS, http://apps.irs.gov/
app/fatcaFfiList/flu.jsf (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
112.  See John A. Koskinen, Prepared Remarks of John A. Koskinen Commissioner 
Internal Revenue Service Before the New York State Bar Association Section of Taxation, 
COMM’R INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.irs.gov/PUP/newsroom/
Commissioner%20Koskinen%20Remarks%20at%20the%20NYSBA%20on%20Feb%2023
%202015.pdf. 
113.  Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-5(a)(2) (2015). (“U.S. account” is defined as any “financial 
account,” including foreign financial assets, owned by a “specified U.S. person.”); see Treas. 
Reg. § 1.1471-4(d)(3)(v) (2015) (FFIs will be making their disclosures using Form 8966 
“FATCA Report”); see also I.R.C. § 1471(c) (2015). 
114.  See I.R.C. § 1471(a) (2015); see also I.R.C. § 1471(b)(1)(D)(i), (d)(6-7) (2015). 
115.  Press Release, U.S. Department of Treasury, Treasury Releases Model 
Intergovernmental Agreement for Implementing the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act to 
Improve Offshore Tax Compliance and Reduce Burden (July 26, 2012), 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1653.aspx [hereinafter Model I 
Press Release]. 
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the financial institutions of these countries to report the required 
FATCA information to their own governments, which then transmit 
the data to the IRS.116 This framework includes elimination of FFI’s 
obligation to negotiate a separate agreement with the IRS.117 An 
alternative arrangement for implementing FATCA is Treasury Model 
II, which retains the structure of direct reporting by the FFIs to the 
IRS followed by information exchange upon request by the 
governments.118 Countries such as Japan and Switzerland have chosen 
this alternative arrangement in lieu of the automatic exchange being 
promised under Treasury Model I.119 The United States has more than 
110 IGAs with various countries, either signed or agreed to in 
substance.120 
The FATCA IGA between Luxembourg and the United States is 
one such example of a Model I IGA.121 As stated previously, the 
ratification of the 2009 Luxembourg Protocol by the United States 
was thought necessary before the Luxembourg-US FATCA IGA 
could enter into force.122 Unfortunately, Senator Rand Paul was 
                                                                                                             
116.  See U.S. Department of Treasury, Model 1 Template, Agreement Between the 
Government of the United States of America and the Government of [FATCA Partner] to 
Improve International Tax Compliance and to Implement FATCA, at 1, 16 (Nov. 30, 2014), 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-Reciprocal-
Model-1A-Agreement-Preexisting-TIEA-or-DTC-11-30-14.pdf [hereinafter Treasury Model 
I]. 
117.  See Model I Press Release, supra note 115. 
118.  See U.S. Department of Treasury, Model 2 Template, Agreement Between the 
Government of the United States of America and the Government of [FATCA Partner] for 
Cooperation to Facilitate the Implementation of FATCA, at 1 (June 6, 2014), 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-Model-2-
Agreement-Preexisting-TIEA-or-DTC-6-6-14.pdf [hereinafter Treasury Model II]. 
119.  Press Release, U.S. Department of Treasury, Statement of Mutual Cooperation and 
Understanding between the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Authorities of Japan to 
Improve International Tax Compliance and to Facilitate Implementation of FATCA, at 1 (June 
11, 2013), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-
Statement-Japan-6-11-2013.pdf. “[T]he Japan-U.S. arrangement appears to have been 
carefully drafted to avoid being called an agreement,” which would have necessitated approval 
by the Japanese Diet. Kristen Parillo, Japan, U.S. Release FATCA Statement, 2013 WTD 113-
1 (June 12, 2013). 
120.  See Resource Center: Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), U.S. DEP’T 
OF TREASURY (2016), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/
FATCA.aspx (last updated Aug. 3, 2016). Seventy-five such Model I agreements have been 
negotiated and the Treasury Department website lists additional countries where there is an 
agreement in substance that will be treated as having an IGA in effect. See id. 
121.  See generally Luxembourg-US FATCA IGA, supra note 37. 
122.  See id. at art. 10. 
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blocking the necessary approval of the Protocol in the US Senate 
because of concerns regarding American privacy rights.123 Notes were 
exchanged between Luxembourg and the United States on March 31 
and April 1, 2015 that modified Article 10 of the Luxembourg-US 
FATCA IGA to only require Luxembourg action to make the 
agreement effective.124 The Luxembourg Parliament adopted the 
FATCA IGA, which had previously been signed on March 28, 2014, 
unanimously on July 1, 2015, a necessary formality for the agreement 
to become effective.125 Thus, Luxembourg completed its internal 
procedures required for the entry into force of the Luxembourg-US 
FATCA IGA on July 29, 2015. September 30, 2015 was the date of 
the first exchange of information with respect to 2014 between the 
Luxembourg tax authorities and the US competent authorities that is 
prescribed by the Luxembourg-US FATCA IGA.126 
The Luxembourg law that implements FATCA includes data 
protection and information obligations necessary to fulfill the 
fundamental rights to privacy and data protection under EU law.127 
                                                                                                             
123.  See Patrick Temple-West, Senator Paul Won’t Budge on Blocking Tax Treaties, 
REUTERS (June 4, 2014, 4:09 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/04/us-usa-tax-
treaties-idUSKBN0EF25M20140604 (“I can’t support a bulk collection tax treaty that has 
complete disregard for the important protections provided to every American by the Fourth 
Amendment.”); Letter from Rand Paul, U.S. Senator, to Harry Reid, Senate Majority Leader 
(May 7, 2014), (on file with the Wall Street Journal.) http://online.wsj.com/public/
resources/documents/PaulLetter050714.pdf (explaining how under Senate rules a senator can 
place a “hold” to prevent a motion from reaching the Senate floor). 
124.  Echange de notes y relatives, signées les 31 mars et 1er avril 2015 – Entrée en 
vigueur (Memorial A, n° 156, p. 3796 du 10 août 2015), http://www.impotsdirects.public.lu/
legislation/legi15/Memorial-A—-N_-156-du-10-aout-2015.pdf (on file with author) (stating 
that internal procedures have been satisfied and law has entered into effect). 
125.  Loi du 24 juillet 2015 portant approbation (Memorial A, n° 145, p. 2984 du 29 
juillet 2015), http://www.impotsdirects.public.lu/legislation/legi15/Memorial-A—-N_-145-du-
29-juillet-2015.pdf (on file with author) [hereinafter Law of 29 July 2015]; see also FATCA- 
IGA Approved by the Parliament, BONN STEICHEN & PARTNERS (July 2, 2015), 
http://www.bsp.lu/publications/articles-books/fatca-iga-approved-parliament#.VZqR93hjqxL; 
Véronique Poujol, Fatca fait l’unanimité, PAPERJAM (July 2, 2015, 9:06 AM), 
http://paperjam.lu/news/fatca-fait-lunanimite. 
126.  See Rectificatif de la loi du 24 juillet 2015 relative á FATCA (Oct. 12, 2015) (on 
file with author). 
127.  See, e.g., Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 8, 2000 O.J. C 
364/11 (“Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her,” in 
particular with respect to the fair processing of data “for specified purposes and on the basis of 
the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law.”); 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 
1950, U.N.T.S. 213; Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic 
 
1174 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:1153 
The FATCA Implementation Law explicitly states that Reporting 
Financial Institutions (“RFI”) are data controllers within the meaning 
of Luxembourg data protection law.128 Thus, in advance of a data 
transmission to the Luxembourg authorities, the RFI must inform any 
affected person that personal data relating to this person will be 
collected and transferred in application of the Luxembourg-US 
IGA.129 Furthermore, this new law details the “elements need[ed] to 
be part of this communication . . . [including] that the person 
concerned has the right to access and rectify the data transmitted.”130 
The Luxembourg tax authorities have also released final versions 
of administrative circulars that provide FATCA guidance.131 One 
circular deals with the information to be reported to the Luxembourg 
direct tax authorities by June 30 for the information from the previous 
year. The Luxembourg tax authorities granted a delay until August 
31, 2015 for the 2014 reporting.132 
As detailed earlier, the G20 finance ministers unanimously 
endorsed the OECD’s CRS proposal in July 2013133 and committed 
“to automatic exchange of information as the new, global 
standard.”134 This is noteworthy as Luxembourg is a member of the 
OECD and is represented in the G20 by the European Union, which is 
the twentieth member of the G20. This new standard built upon the 
FATCA Model I IGA and requires “the automatic annual exchange of 
                                                                                                             
Processing of Personal Data art. 16(1), Jan. 28, 1981 ETS 108/1981; see also Council 
Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of Individuals With Regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. L 281/31 art. 2(a) (defining personal 
data as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable legal person (‘data subject’)”). 
128.  See Law of 29 July 2015, supra note 125, at art. 4(3). 
129.  See id. at art. 4(4). 
130.  FATCA-Luxembourg Law Transposing the Luxembourg-US IGA, and Circular 
Letters Published, DELOITTE (2015), http://www2.deloitte.com/lu/en/pages/tax/articles/fatca-
lux-law-transposition-lux-us-iga-circular-letters.html?Id=lu:2em:3cc:4dcom_share:5awa: 
6dcom:tax [hereinafter FATCA Circulars]. 
131.  For an example of a circular created by the Luxembourg government, see 
Circulaire du directeur des contributions, GOUVERNEMENT DU GRAND-GRAND-DUCHÉ DE 
LUXEMBOURC (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.impotsdirects.public.lu/legislation/legi16/
Circulaire-ECHA-3bis-du-18-fevrier-2016.pdf. 
132.  See Newsletter du 31 juillet 2015, ADMINISTRATION DES CONTRIBUTIONS 
DIRECTES, http://www.impotsdirects.public.lu/archive/newsletter/2015/nl_31072015/index. 
html (“Le délai pour échanger les fichiers de l’année fiscale 2014 dans le cadre de FATCA est 
reporté exceptionnellement au 31 août 2015.”). 
133.  See OECD, AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNT INFORMATION, 
supra note 31, at 6. 
134.  G20 MOSCOW, supra note 32. 
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bank information on residents of countries who directly or indirectly 
hold bank accounts in other countries.”135 The head of the OECD’s 
Center for Tax Policy Pascal Saint-Amans explained, “[t]he idea is to 
put an end to the fact that you can hide your money in an offshore 
jurisdiction, and not report that money.”136 The G7 leaders reaffirmed 
their commitment to promoting this global standard for automatic 
exchange of information at the G7 Summit in Germany on June 8, 
2015.137 On July 30, 2015, Luxembourg approved legislation that 
would introduce CRS as of January 1, 2017, reporting on calendar 
year 2016.138 
The pending increased exchange of information with the United 
States also accelerated the timetable for the automatic exchange of 
information between the Member States. Thus, on June 12, 2013, the 
Commission proposed an extension of mandatory automatic 
information exchange to dividends, capital gains, other financial 
income, and account balances as of January 1, 2015 for information 
from the 2014 tax year.139 The Commission acknowledged that the 
IGAs that the EU Member States have concluded with the United 
States with regard to FATCA “have given further impetus to 
[automatic exchange of information] as a way of combating tax fraud 
                                                                                                             
135.  Id.; see Byrce Baschuk, G-20 Nations Say They Are on Track To Fight 
International Tax-Evasion Activity, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Nov. 18, 2014, at I-2. 
(“Specifically, the standard requires banks in a particular jurisdiction to report to their 
government all the banking information—transactions, account balances, interest, dividends 
and other forms of financial income.”). 
136.  G20 MOSCOW, supra note 32. Saint-Amans told reporters at a G20 news 
conference, “[i]f you don’t hold the account directly, which is very often the case of high-end 
wealth individuals, but through a company which is held offshore, through a trust which is 
held offshore, this information still will have to be sent to the country of residence, or the 
beneficial owner—the ultimate owner of the bank account.” Baschuk, supra note 135. 
137.  See Press Release, The White House, G-7 Leaders’ Declaration (June 8, 2015), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/06/08/g-7-leaders-declaration. (“Moreover, 
we look forward to the rapid implementation of the new single global standard for automatic 
exchange of information by the end of 2017 or 2018, including by all financial centres subject 
to completing necessary legislative procedures. We also urge jurisdictions that have not yet, or 
not adequately, implemented the international standard for the exchange of information on 
request to do so expeditiously.”). 
138.  See Ann M. Miller, Luxembourg Approves Bill on Automatic Exchange of 
Financial Information, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Aug. 4, 2015. 
139.  See Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Amending Directive 
2011/16/EU as Regards Mandatory Automatic Exchange of Information in the Field of 
Taxation, COM (2013) 348 final (June 12, 2013) at 9-10. 
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and evasion.”140 The Member States adopted a revision to the 2011 
DAC in December 2014 that essentially implements the new 
OECD/G20 global standard of automatic exchange (CRS) within the 
European Union starting in 2017 (also known as “European 
FATCA”).141 Luxembourg and other Member States are required to 
implement European FATCA by enacting domestic legislation by 
December 31, 2015.142 Luxembourg did so on August 10, 2015.143 
The Commission set up an Expert Group on automatic exchange 
of financial account information for direct taxation purposes (“AEFI 
Group”) in October 2014 to attempt to ensure that the EU legislation 
aligns with the OECD global standard on automatic exchange so as to 
minimize the administrative burden on financial intermediaries.144 
Unfortunately, this has not been done successfully with respect to the 
FATCA implementation rules, and there is no single global standard. 
The automatic exchange of information required by European 
FATCA and CRS goes beyond FATCA, as there are no thresholds 
and all amounts must be reported.145 Also, the CRS does not exempt 
certain vehicles that are excluded by Annex II to the Model I FATCA 
IGA from reporting, such as treaty-qualified retirement funds, 
financial institutions with only low value accounts, and sponsored 
                                                                                                             
140.  Id. at 3. 
141.  See 2011 DAC, supra note 67, amended by Council Directive 2014/107/EU, 2014 
O.J. L. 359 [hereinafter DAC II or European FATCA]. On December 9, 2014, Council 
Directive 2003/48/EC of June 3, 2003, on taxation of savings income in the form of interest 
payments, was completely replaced by Council Directive 2014/48/EU of March 24, 2014, and 
this latest directive will now be eliminated and absorbed by Council Directive 2011/16/EU on 
administrative cooperation, as amended by Council Directive 2014/107/EU of December 9, 
2014. 
142.  See, e.g., U.K. Revenue & Customs, U.K. Issues Financial Accounts Automatic 
Info Exchange Guidance, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, May 22, 2015. 
143.  See Projet de loi n° 6858, Session ordinaire 2014-2015, http://www.impotsdirects. 
public.lu/archive/newsletter/2015/nl_27052015/Projet-de-loi-n_-6858.pdf. 
144.  EUROPEAN COMMISSION, FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSION AEFI EXPERT 
GROUP ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVE 2014/107/EU FOR AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNT INFORMATION European Commission (Mar. 2015), http://ec.europa.eu/
taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/tax_cooperation/mutual_assistance/financial
_account/first_report_expert_group_automatic_exchange_financial_information.pdf (on file 
with author). 
145.  Luxembourg-”European FATCA” in 2016, KPMG, http://www.kpmg.com/
global/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/taxnewsflash/pages/2014-2/luxembourg-
european-fatca-in-2016.aspx (last visited June 2, 2015) (on file with author). 
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investment entities.146 Furthermore, CRS lacks the small local 
financial intermediary exception of the IGAs. With respect to an 
investment entity, including one in a non-adopting jurisdiction, 
“CRS’s due diligence standards require the custodian use its anti-
money laundering and know your customer information to report 
what it knows about the managers or beneficial ownership of the 
entity.”147 Although for FATCA, “financial institutions can stop 
identification processes once they reach a reportable entity,” CRS 
ensures transparency by requiring “institutions to look through and 
determine controlling persons for both passive nonfinancial entities 
and investment entities in nonparticipating jurisdictions.”148 
One hundred and one jurisdictions have committed to the 
automatic exchange of information.149 The OECD states in a footnote 
to its list of automatic exchange of information commitments that the 
United States will be undertaking automatic information exchanges 
from 2015 onward in accordance with FATCA and pursuant to its 
Intergovernmental Agreements with other jurisdictions.150 Critics are 
saying that this resistance to the global disclosure standards of CRS is 
effectively making the United States “the biggest tax haven in the 
world.”151 The IRS’s response is that it will only engage in reciprocal 
information exchanges with foreign jurisdictions that meet stringent 
                                                                                                             
146.  OECD, STANDARD FOR AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION IN 
TAX MATTERS IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK 89-90 (2015), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/
exchange-of-tax-information/implementation-handbook-standard-for-automatic-exchange-of-
financial-information-in-tax-matters.pdf [hereinafter OECD, CRS HANDBOOK]. For a detailed 
comparison of CRS and FATCA Model I IGA, see id. at Part III. 
147.  Lee Sheppard, The Reformation of FATCA, 78 TAX NOTES INT’L 597, 598 (2015). 
148.  Andrew Velarde, Official Questions Treatment of U.S. on OECD Reporting 
Standard, 147 TAX NOTES 1008, 1008 (2015); see also OECD, CRS HANDBOOK, supra note 
146, at 94. 
149.  For the complete list of countries, see OECD, AEOI: STATUS OF COMMITMENTS, 
supra note 40. 
150.  See id. at n.1. 
151.  Jesse Drucker, The World’s Favorite New Tax Haven is the United States, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 27, 2016, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2016-01-27/the-world-s-favorite-new-tax-haven-is-the-united-states (noting how, 
for example, Rothschild, a European financial institution, is moving the wealth of foreign 
clients out of tax havens such as Bermuda into trusts set up in Nevada, “one of several states 
promoting low taxes and confidentiality in their trust laws.”); see also Scott Dyreng et al., 
Exploring the Role Delaware Plays as a Tax Haven (Oxford University Centre for Business 
Taxation), Working Paper No. WP 12/12 (2012). 
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privacy and technical standards.152 The Tax Justice Network report 
severely criticizes the United States’ unwillingness to participate in 
transparency initiatives such as the CRS and the creation of public 
registers of beneficial ownership, moving it up to third place on its 
financial secrecy index.153 On the other hand, the report praises the 
progress being made by Luxembourg, moving it from second to sixth 
place.154 
The US’ Model 1A IGAs “include a political commitment to 
pursue the adoption of regulations and to advocate and support 
relevant legislation to achieve such equivalent levels of reciprocal 
automatic exchange.”155 Starting with payments of interest not 
effectively connected with a US trade or business made in 2013 from 
an account maintained at a US office,156 both US and certain non-US 
resident accounts will be uniformly disclosed to the IRS pursuant to 
Treasury regulations finalized in 2012.157 This will facilitate “the 
ability of the United States to offer cooperative, reciprocal tax 
information exchange arrangements” with designated foreign tax 
administrations.158 However, even though Senator Levin strongly 
recommended that the bank deposit regulations also be made 
applicable to accounts opened by corporations, trusts, or other entities 
that are beneficially owned by individuals,159 this recommendation 
                                                                                                             
152.  See Robert Wood, U.S. Ranks as Top Tax Haven, Refusing to Share Tax Data 
Despite FATCA, FORBES (Nov. 3, 2015, 8:46 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/
2015/11/03/u-s-ranks-as-top-tax-haven-refusing-to-share-tax-data-despite-
fatca/#1b5b5ddd5928. 
153.  See Financial Secrecy Index 2015 reveals improving global financial 
transparency, but USA threatens progress, TAX JUSTICE NETWORK, Nov. 2, 2015, 
http://www.taxjustice.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/FSI-2015-Presser.pdf. 
154.  See id. at 6 (“In 2013, we called Luxembourg the ‘Death Star of financial secrecy 
inside Europe’…Yet Luxembourg is among our greatest improvers . . . “). 
155.  OECD, AEOI: STATUS OF COMMITMENTS, supra note 40, at n.1. 
156.  Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6049-4(b)(5), 1.6049-8(a) (as amended in 2012). 
157.  Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6049-4, 1.6049-5, 1.6049-6 (as amended in 2012). 
158.  Proposed Regulations to Require Reporting of Nonresident Alien Deposit Interest 
Income: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Fin. Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. 
Comm. on Financial Services, 112th Cong. 96 (2011) (letter from Sen. Carl Levin to Comm’r 
Douglas H. Shulman) [hereinafter Hearing on Interest Reporting Regulations]. 
159.  See id. at 99 (“[I]f a financial institution knows that the beneficial owner of an 
account is a non-U.S. individual, the financial institution should disclose the account to the 
IRS, even if the account is nominally held in the name of a foreign entity.”). Senators Levin 
and Grassley were also advocating legislation that would require states to document the 
beneficial owners of the corporations. See Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement 
Assistance Act, S. 1483, 112th Cong. (2011). This legislation has been introduced in the 114th 
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was unfortunately not followed in the final bank deposit regulations. 
FATCA, on the other hand, requires foreign financial institutions to 
report on accounts held by an entity where more than ten percent is 
owned by a US person.160 Thus, the bank deposit reporting rules only 
apply to the nonbusiness interest on directly held bank deposits of 
certain nonresident individuals.161 
The preamble to the finalized bank deposit regulations stressed 
that information will only be exchanged where the United States is 
satisfied that the “foreign jurisdiction’s legal framework” guarantees 
the confidentiality of the taxpayer information.162 Thus, the finalized 
bank deposit regulations only require reporting of “interest paid to a 
nonresident alien individual resident in a country with which the 
United States has” an information exchange agreement in force.163 
This is extremely unfortunate because, from a compliance standpoint, 
it is easier for financial institutions to report all interest.164 
Furthermore, the United States does not have as extensive a network 
of information exchange agreements as some of our trading 
partners.165 However, the list of countries eligible for the automatic 
exchange of the information being collected under these regulations 
has increased from a single country, Canada, to a list of thirty-seven 
countries.166 Nevertheless, as the United States is expecting global 
                                                                                                             
Congress in the House of Representatives as H.R. 4450 and in the Senate as S. 2489. 
Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act, H.R. 4450, 114th Cong. 
(2016) and S. 2489, 114th Cong. (2016). 
160. See I.R.C. §§ 1471(d), 1473(2)(A)(i). 
161.  See Lee A. Sheppard, Will U.S. Hypocrisy on Information Sharing Continue?, 138 
TAX NOTES 253, 256 (2013) (“[I]n other words, the stupid rich. Because the sophisticated rich 
use corporations and Delaware LLCs, they would not be affected.”). 
162.  T.D. 9584, 77 Fed. Reg. at 23392 [hereinafter Bank Deposit regulations]. 
163.  Id. at 23393 (noting these countries must be willing and able to reciprocate as well 
as have effective confidentiality laws and practices that ensure the use of the information only 
for the purposes of administering and enforcing their own tax laws). 
164.  Payors of course “may elect to report interest payments to all nonresident alien 
individuals” but financial institutions may not feel that they can do so unless mandated by law. 
Id. at 23393. 
165.  A revenue procedure lists the eligible countries and territories that have the 
appropriate agreements to exchange information by request. See Rev. Proc. 2014-64, 2014-53 
I.R.B. 1022 (listing “countries with which the United States has in effect an income tax or 
other convention or bilateral agreement relating to the exchange of information”). 
166.  See id. at § 4. Countries where Treasury has deemed automatic exchange is 
appropriate include Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Guernsey, 
Ireland, Isle of Man, Italy, Jersey, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and 
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compliance from foreign financial institutions, US financial 
institutions should be collecting the same information.167 
On May 26, 2014, Luxembourg ratified the Convention on 
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters as well as its 
amending protocol. It entered into force on November 1, 2014.168 The 
parties of the Convention provide administrative assistance to each 
other in tax matters such as exchange of information, assistance in 
recovery, and service of documents.169 Although the United States is a 
founding signatory of the Convention on Mutual Administrative 
Assistance in Tax Matters,170 the Convention did not enter into force 
until April 1, 1995 subject to certain reservations.171 Pursuant to these 
reservations, the United States will not provide or receive assistance: 
(1) for taxes imposed by local authorities; (2) in the recovery of any 
tax claim; or (3) in serving documents.172 On May 27, 2010, the 
Deputy Secretary of State signed, on behalf of the United States, a 
Protocol to the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance at 
the OECD in Paris, France.173 However, as of July 2016, the United 
States has yet to either deposit the instrument of ratification or enter 
the Protocol into force.174 
The United States does actively participate in the Global Forum 
on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, the 
multilateral framework within which work on tax transparency and 
                                                                                                             
the United Kingdom. This list has been supplemented to add nineteen additional countries. See 
Rev. Proc. 2015-50, 2015-42 I.R.B. 583 and Rev. Proc. 2016-18, 2016-17 I.R.B. 635. 
167.  See Kaye, supra note 80, at 390. 
168.  See generally OECD, JURISDICTIONS PARTICIPATING IN THE CONVENTION ON 
MUTUAL ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE IN TAX MATTERS STATUS (Feb. 8, 2016), 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/Status_of_convention.pdf [hereinafter 
OECD, STATUS OF THE CONVENTION]. 
169.  See generally OECD, CONVENTION ON MUTUAL ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE 
IN TAX MATTERS AND AMENDING PROTOCOLS (1988). 
170.  See generally OECD, STATUS OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 168. The United 
States signed the Original Convention in 1989 and provided the deposit of instrument of 
ratification in 1991. 
171.  See id. 
172.  STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 101ST CONG., EXPLANATION OF 
PROPOSED CONVENTION ON MUTUAL ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE IN TAX MATTERS 3 
(Comm. Print 1990) https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3160. 
173.  Press Release, U.S. Department of Treasury, United States Signs Protocol to 
Multilateral Treaty on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (May 27, 2010), 
http:// www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg726.aspx. 
174.  OECD, STATUS OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 168. 
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exchange of information has been accomplished since 2000 by over 
120 OECD and non-OECD jurisdictions.175 The Global Forum 
performs peer reviews of its member jurisdictions in two phases: in 
Phase 1, examining the quality of the “legal and regulatory 
framework for transparency and the exchange of information for tax 
purposes”;176 and in Phase 2, evaluating the implementation in 
practice of the international standards reflected in the 2002 OECD 
Model Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters and its 
commentary, as well as Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention on Income and on Capital (OECD Model Tax 
Convention) and its commentary.177 
As of 2011, the Global Forum had completed its combined 
Phase 1 and Phase 2 reviews of the US tax system.178 It examined the 
categories of availability of information, access of information, and 
exchanging information.179 With respect to availability of 
information, the United States was largely compliant concerning 
ownership information and reliable accounting records for entities and 
compliant with respect to banking information.180 Regarding the 
access of information and exchanging information categories, the 
Global Forum determined the United States to be compliant.181 
However, recommendations were provided for each of the respective 
categories.182 For example, information exchange partners had 
complained about the unavailability of beneficial ownership 
information of LLCs in several states, including Delaware.183 
Following the combined review, an overall rating of “Largely 
Compliant” was awarded to the United States.184 
The Obama Administration has acknowledged the importance of 
the information received from the US treaty and information 
                                                                                                             
175.  OECD, GLOBAL FORUM, supra note 35, at 2. 
176.  Id. at 3-4. 
177.  See OECD, GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY AND EXCHANGE OF 
INFORMATION FOR TAX PURPOSES PEER REVIEWS: UNITED STATES 2011: COMBINED: PHASE 
1+ PHASE 2, 5 (2011), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264115064-en [hereinafter OECD, 
UNITED STATES 2011 REVIEW]. 
178.  See id. at 11-12. 
179.  See id. at 11. 
180.  See OECD, GLOBAL FORUM, supra note 35, at 16 tbl.2. 
181.  See id. 
182.  OECD, UNITED STATES 2011 REVIEW, supra note 177, at 91, 93, 96. 
183.  Id. at 38-39, 87. 
184.  See OECD, GLOBAL FORUM, supra note 35, at 30 tbl.1. 
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exchange partners to the IRS enforcement efforts against offshore tax 
evasion.185 As detailed in Intergovernmental Agreements, these 
jurisdictions such as Luxembourg expect US cooperation and 
reciprocity in information exchange.186 Since the enactment of 
FATCA, the President has repeatedly proposed that US financial 
institutions be required to report to the IRS the same information 
“with respect to accounts held by certain foreign persons, or certain 
passive entities with substantial foreign owners” currently required of 
FFIs.187 Enactment of these proposals is necessary if the IRS is to 
exchange equivalent information to be used by the US information 
exchange partners in their efforts to address the tax evasion by their 
residents. It is concerning that the current breakdown of the US 
legislative process has not allowed the United States to participate 
fully in the global movement toward transparency after having been 
the leading proponent of this movement. Luxembourg has the 
advantage of being able to swiftly enact the legislation necessary to 
implement the transparency policies accepted by its government. 
II. ADVANCE TAX RULINGS 
In the fall of 2014, a former PwC auditor allegedly leaked 
documents to the ICIJ.188 The LuxLeaks incident has put Luxembourg 
even further on the defensive. In an interview, Luxembourg Finance 
Minister Gramegna stated that “[u]nfortunately, people who don’t 
know Luxembourg all too often believe that our success is built on 
secrecy or that multinational companies come here to benefit from 
alleged ‘tax deals.’”189 He further explained that these tax rulings 
were merely advance decisions confirming the tax treatment of a 
                                                                                                             
185.  See US Department of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration’s 
Fiscal Year 2016 Revenue Proposals 219 (Feb. 2015) [hereinafter 2016 Greenbook]. 
186.  See, e.g., Luxembourg-US FATCA IGA, supra note 37. 
187.  2016 Greenbook, supra note 185, at 220. See also US Department of the Treasury, 
General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2017 Revenue Proposals 203 
(February 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-
Explanations-FY2017.pdf. 
188. See Wayne et al., supra note 2. Antoine Deltour has since received a 12-month 
suspended prison sentence after having been charged with “domestic theft, violation of 
professional secrecy, violation of business secrets, laundering, and fraudulent access to a 
system of automatic data treatment.” See Bowers, supra note 3. 
189.  Pierre Gramegna, Expertise, Not Taxes is the Secret to Luxembourg’s Success, 
LUXEMBOURGFORFINANCE (Jan. 2015), http://www.luxembourgforfinance.com/sites/
luxembourgforfinance/files/lff_mag_december_v8_0.pdf at 3. 
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given transaction that is issued by the tax administration. These 
rulings are not publicly available,190 just like all other tax documents 
related to the taxpayer’s filing, but are accessible to the tax authorities 
of the company’s home office. He went on to insist that “Luxembourg 
has embraced transparency” and is “committed to ensuring that all 
bank clients are tax compliant and that companies pay their fair share 
of taxes.”191 
The OECD’s 1998 report entitled Harmful Tax Competition: An 
Emerging Global Issue set forth its criteria for evaluating preferential 
tax regimes192 and certain Luxembourg provisions (such as the 
Luxembourg 1929 holding company regime) were subsequently 
identified as “potentially harmful.”193 Further, the 1998 report noted: 
[W]here a non-transparent regime allows the tax administration 
to give a prior determination to an individual taxpayer . . . this 
failure to notify the foreign tax authority [affected by such a 
decision] may curtail the ability of that tax authority to enforce 
effectively its rules.194 
The OECD Harmful Tax Competition Report’s 
recommendations focused on improving transparency and 
communication among nations and led to the establishment of the 
OECD Model Agreement on Exchange of Information in Tax Matters 
in 2002.195 
                                                                                                             
190.  See id. 
191.  Id. 
192.  See OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE 19–35 
(1998), http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/44430243.pdf [hereinafter OECD, HARMFUL 
TAX COMPETITION REPORT]. The 1998 Report identified four main criteria for determining 
whether a preferential tax regime is harmful: (1) no or low taxation on the relevant income; (2) 
lack of transparency; (3) lack of effective exchange of information; and (4) the regime is ring-
fenced from the domestic economy. See id. 
193.  OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION: REPORT TO THE 2000 
MINISTERIAL COUNCIL MEETING AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMMITTEE ON FISCAL 
AFFAIRS: PROGRESS IN IDENTIFYING AND ELIMINATING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES 12-13 
(2000), http://www.oecd.org/tax/harmful/2090192.pdf. Three tax regimes located in 
Luxembourg that were identified as potentially harmful included: 1. Insurance - “Provisions 
for Fluctuations in Re-Insurance Companies”; 2. Financing and Leasing – “Finance Branch”; 
and 3. Fund Managers – “Management companies [Taxation of management companies that 
manage only one mutual fund (1929 holdings)].” Id. at 13. 
194.  OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION REPORT, supra note 192, ¶ 66, at 30. 
195.  See OECD, AGREEMENT ON EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON TAX MATTERS 4, 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/2082215.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2015) 
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Commissioned by the G20 after the financial crisis, the OECD 
issued a report on base erosion and profit shifting (“BEPS”)196 in 
February 2013 and followed up this report in July 2013 with an 
Action Plan of fifteen steps to address profit shifting by multinational 
corporations.197 The OECD BEPS Action Plan once again targets 
harmful tax practices by establishing a working party on aggressive 
tax planning and by requiring disclosure of aggressive tax planning 
arrangements.198 The second priority listed in the Harmful Tax 
Practices Interim Report for Action Item 5 (Countering Harmful 
Practices More Effectively, Taking into Account Transparency and 
Substance) is the improvement of tax transparency, which includes 
“compulsory spontaneous exchange on rulings related to preferential 
regimes.”199 The Harmful Tax Practices Interim Report highlights the 
inability of the home country to take defensive measures when the 
host country has negotiable tax provisions and a lack of transparency 
with respect to the administration of its tax regime.200 The OECD 
guidance set forth in 2004 clarifies that advance tax rulings can cause 
issues where not shared with the resident country affected.201 
Similar tax ruling procedures are common in many jurisdictions 
in the European Union. The Commission has been looking into the 
tax ruling practices of certain Member States because of “media 
reports alleging that some companies have received significant tax 
reductions by way of ‘tax rulings’ issued by national tax 
authorities.”202 The Commission is examining the compatibility of the 
                                                                                                             
(providing a non-binding agreement that sets forth two models for bilateral agreements for 
increasing transparency among nations). 
196.  See OECD, ADDRESSING BEPS, supra note 10, at 15 (reviewing various data and 
studies, and finding an increased separation between the locations of the actual business 
activities and the reporting of profits for tax purposes). 
197.  See OECD, BEPS ACTION PLAN, supra note 11. 
198.  See id., Action 5, at 18 (“Revamp the work on harmful tax practices with a priority 
on improving transparency, including compulsory spontaneous exchange on rulings related to 
preferential regimes, and on . . . “). The OECD envisions revising the existing framework by 
December 2015. See id. at 31. 
199.  OECD, COUNTERING HARMFUL PRACTICES, supra note 12, at 35. 
200.  See id. 
201.  See OECD, CONSOLIDATED APPLICATION NOTE: GUIDANCE IN APPLYING THE 
1998 REPORT TO PREFERENTIAL TAX REGIMES 53 (2004), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/harmful/
30901132.pdf. 
202.  European Commission Press Release IP/14/663, State aid: Commission 
investigates transfer pricing arrangements on corporate taxation of Apple (Ireland) Starbucks 
(Netherlands) and Fiat Finance and Trade (Luxembourg) (June 11, 2014), 
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tax ruling practices with EU state aid rules “in the context of 
aggressive tax planning by certain multinationals with a view to 
ensure a level playing field.”203 The commissioner for taxation noted: 
Fair tax competition is essential for the integrity of the Single 
Market, for the fiscal sustainability of our Member States, and for 
a level-playing field between our businesses. Our social and 
economic model relies on it, so we must do all we can to defend 
it.204 
EU State aid rules prohibit granting certain companies selective 
advantages that distort competition in the internal market. In general, 
State aid is financial support given by a government to a certain 
business sector, enterprise, or geographic region through either direct 
or indirect transfer of resources.205 Specifically, Article 107(1) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”), states: 
Any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in 
any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort 
competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production 
of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between the 
Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.206 
Case law from the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(“CJEU”) has found that selective tax advantages may amount to 
State aid.207 The point is that in order to guarantee “free and fair 
competition within the EU’s internal market, national governments 
[are] restrained from giving special tax benefits (or subsidies) to 
                                                                                                             
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-663_en.htm [hereinafter Press Release, Transfer 
Pricing Arrangements]. 
203.  European Commission Press Release IP/14/2742, State Aid: Commission Extends 
Information Enquiry on Tax Rulings Practice to all Member States (Dec. 17, 2014), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-2742_en.htm [hereinafter Press Release, Enquiry on 
Tax Ruling Practice] (“A number of Member States seem to allow multinational companies to 
take advantage of their tax systems and thereby reduce their tax burden.”) 
204.  Press Release, Transfer Pricing Arrangements, supra note 202, at 1 (emphasis 
removed). 
205.  CARLO PINTO, TAX COMPETITION AND EU LAW 100 (2003). 
206.  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 
107, 2012 O.J. C326/47 at 91 [hereinafter TFEU]; see also Wolfgang Schön, Taxation and 
State Aid Law in the European Union, 36 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 911, 919 (1999). 
207.  See Pierpaolo Rossi-Maccanico, Fiscal Aid, Tax Competition, and BEPS, 75 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 857, 858 (2014); see also Commission Notice on the Application of the State Aid 
Rules to Measures Relating to Direct Business Taxation, 1998, O.J. C 384/03. 
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specific sectors of the economy or to individual companies” unless 
this would “serve a common European goal.”208 
The Commission takes the position that as long as a tax 
administration’s advance ruling system merely interprets the relevant 
tax provisions, the tax rulings will not violate the state aid 
provisions:209 
Tax rulings as such are not problematic: they are comfort letters 
by tax authorities giving a specific company clarity on how its 
corporate tax will be calculated or on the use of special tax 
provisions. However, tax rulings may involve state aid within the 
meaning of EU rules if they are used to provide selective 
advantages to a specific company or group of companies.210 
Thus, starting in June 2013, the Commission began demanding 
documents with respect to the tax ruling practices of seven Member 
States: Belgium, Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.211 Luxembourg asserted that 
the Commission was overreaching and filed a lawsuit in the General 
Court of the European Union alleging “infringement of the procedural 
rules on state aid investigations and an encroachment on the 
autonomous competence of the Member States in direct tax 
matters.”212 This action for annulment was based on Article 263 
TFEU, which gives the General Court the competence to “review the 
legality . . . of acts of the Commission . . . on grounds of lack of 
competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, . . 
. or misuse of powers.”213 
On June 11, 2014, the Commission began three formal 
investigations to determine whether the tax rulings issued by the tax 
                                                                                                             
208.  Raymond Luja, EU State Aid Rules and Their Limits, 76 TAX NOTES INT’L 535 
(2014). When there are State aid violations, the Commission is able to intervene and “order the 
recovery of any tax benefit or subsidy received in violation of EU rules, plus interest.” Id. 
(citing Council Regulation 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 
93 of the EC Treaty art. 14, 1999 O.J. L 83). 
209.  See TFEU, supra note 206. However, discretionary powers that allow the tax 
administration to deviate from the tax law are presumed to constitute unlawful state aid 
especially when there is a lack of transparency with respect to the decisions rendered. See id. 
210.  Press Release, Transfer Pricing Arrangements, supra note 202. 
211.  See Press Release, Enquiry on Tax Ruling Practice, supra note 203. 
212.  Werner Haslehner, Advance Rulings and State Aid: Investigative Powers of the EU 
Commission (T-258/14), in ECJ-RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN DIRECT TAXATION 2014, 90 
(Michael Lang et al. eds., 2015) [hereinafter Haslehner, Advance Rulings and State Aid]. 
213.  Id. at 92. 
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administrations in Ireland, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg with 
respect to the transfer pricing arrangements of Apple, Starbucks, and 
Fiat Finance and Trade, respectively, violate state aid restrictions.214 
The calculation of the taxable income proposed by the corporation 
can include reimbursement of a subsidiary or a branch based on fair 
market value. State aid will not be found as long as this reflects 
normal conditions of competition. However, calculations not 
reflecting market terms “could imply a more favourable treatment of 
the company compared to the treatment other taxpayers would 
normally receive under the Member States’ tax rules. This may 
constitute state aid.”215 The Commission Vice President in charge of 
competition policy stated: 
In the current context of tight public budgets, it is particularly 
important that large multinationals pay their fair share of taxes. 
Under the EU’s state aid rules, national authorities cannot take 
measures allowing certain companies to pay less tax than they 
should if the tax rules of the Member State were applied in a fair 
and non-discriminatory way.216 
In the fall of 2014, the Commission made preliminary findings 
that Ireland’s APA with Apple Inc. and the Netherland’s APA with 
Starbucks Corp. constituted illegal state aid.217 The Commission, after 
                                                                                                             
214.  See Press Release, Transfer Pricing Arrangements, supra note 202; see also id. at 
1 (“The opening of an in-depth investigation gives interested third parties, as well as the three 
Member States concerned, an opportunity to submit comments.”); id. at 1-2 (“Transfer pricing 
refers to the prices charged for commercial transactions between various parts of the same 
group of companies, in particular prices set for goods sold or services provided by one 
subsidiary of a corporate group to another subsidiary of the same group. Transfer pricing 
influences the allocation of taxable profit between subsidiaries of a group located in different 
countries.”). 
215.  Id. at 2 (“The Commission will examine if the three transfer pricing arrangements 
validated in the following tax rulings involve state aid to the benefit of the beneficiary 
companies: the individual rulings issued by the Irish tax authorities on the calculation of the 
taxable profit allocated to the Irish branches of Apple Sales International and of Apple 
Operations Europe; the individual ruling issued by the Dutch tax authorities on the calculation 
of the taxable basis in the Netherlands for manufacturing activities of Starbucks Manufacturing 
EMEA BV; the individual ruling issued by the Luxembourgish tax authorities on the 
calculation of the taxable basis in Luxembourg for the financing activities of Fiat Finance and 
Trade.”). 
216.  Id. at 1. 
217.  See Commission Decision of State Aid SA. 38375 (2014/NN) (ex 2014/CP) 
Luxembourg: Alleged Aid to FFT, C (2014) 3627 final of June 11, 2014; European 
Commission Decision of State Aid SA. 38373 (2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) (ex 2014/CP) Ireland: 
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examining the information supplied by the Irish authorities “decided 
to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) TFEU.”218 If the 
Commission finds against Ireland, Apple Inc. will be required to 
repay ten years of tax savings back to Ireland.219 In October 2015, the 
Commission found that the Fiat and Starbucks tax rulings did grant a 
selective tax advantage.220 
Luxembourg, unlike the Netherlands and Ireland, did not provide 
the Commission with the complete information demanded, 
specifically a list of all of the tax rulings made in 2010, 2011, and 
2012.221 Because of the failure to adequately answer these requests for 
information, the Commission adopted an information injunction 
ordering Luxembourg to deliver the requested information.222 The 
procedural regulation on State aid “entitles the Commission to request 
any information it deems necessary to assess for a state aid 
investigation.”223 Furthermore, Member States are not allowed to 
invoke professional secrecy as a justification “for refusing to provide 
information requested by the Commission.”224 
                                                                                                             
Alleged Aid to Apple, C (2014) 3606 final of June 11, 2014 [hereinafter Commission 
Decision, Alleged Aid to Apple]. 
218.  Commission Decision, Alleged Aid to Apple, supra note 217, at 1. 
219.  See Devika Krishna Kumar, Apple Says EU Probe of Irish Tax Policy could be 
‘Material’, REUTERS (Apr. 29, 2015, 2:44 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/29/us-
apple-tax-idUSKBN0NK2AU20150429. 
220.  See European Commission Press Release IP/15/5880, Commission Decides 
Selective Tax Advantages for Fiat in Luxembourg and Starbucks in the Netherlands are Illegal 
Under EU State Aid Rules (Oct. 21, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-
5880_en.htm. 
221.  See Haslehner, Advance Rulings and State Aid, supra note 212, at 91; see also id. 
(stating that the Commission had “requested detailed information regarding Luxembourg’s tax 
ruling practice …and also a complete list of all rulings issued by Luxembourg’s tax 
administration for the years 2010, 2011 and 2012…”); id. (noting that Luxembourg had 
responded by only providing information on the legal mechanisms of its ruling practice, taking 
the position that the demand for the list was “without proper legal basis.”). 
222.  See European Commission Press Release IP/14/1309, State Aid: Commission 
Orders Luxembourg to Deliver Information on Tax Practices, (Mar. 24, 2014), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-309_en.htm; see also Haslehner, Advance Rulings 
and State Aid, supra note 212, at 92 (citing Commission decision C (2014) 1986 final (case 
number SA.37267), Pratiques en matiere fiscal-Luxembourg). 
223.  Press Release, Enquiry on Tax Ruling Practice, supra note 203; see also Council 
Regulation 659/1999, art.10(3), 1999 O.J. L 83 (laying Down Detailed Rules for the 
Application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). 
224.  Press Release, Enquiry on Tax Ruling Practice, supra note 203; see also 
Commission Communication C(2003) 4582 of 1 December 2003 on Professional Secrecy in 
State Aid Decisions, 2003 O.J. C 297/03. 
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A draft law submitted to the Luxembourg Parliament on October 
15, 2014, prior to the LuxLeaks, introduced a formal procedure for 
tax rulings.225 The Luxembourg tax ruling procedures were heavily 
criticized after the LuxLeaks scandal, which probably assured speedy 
legislative action.226 As adopted on December 19, 2014, these new 
procedures require, after a written request, that the head of the 
competent tax office confirm the tax consequences of the transactions 
contemplated by the taxpayer. This confirmation binds the 
Luxembourg tax authorities for five years.227 On December 23, 2014, 
the government adopted a Grand-Ducal Regulation that provided 
further details, such as the creation of “a tax ruling commission to 
assist tax offices with the execution and the harmonized application of 
Luxembourg domestic and international tax law.”228 In a further 
initiative toward tax transparency, tax rulings will be published as 
“anonymous summaries in the annual report of the Luxembourg tax 
administration.”229 Tax rulings are issued to provide legal certainty 
for taxpayers, and these new procedures will assist in the uniform 
interpretation of tax laws. 
Luxembourg withdrew the lawsuit against the Commission when 
the Commission agreed to expand its investigation into the 
compatibility of tax ruling practices with EU State aid rules to all 
Member States.230 According to Luxembourg’s finance minister: 
“Luxembourg has repeatedly stated that the analysis of matters 
relating to international taxation and tax rulings calls for a broad 
                                                                                                             
225.  See Patrick Mischo & Franz Kerger, After ‘Lux Leaks’: Welcome Changes to 
Luxembourg’s Tax Ruling Practice, 77 TAX NOTES INT’L 1197, 1197 (2015) [hereinafter 
Mischo & Kerger]; OECD, LUXEMBOURG 2011 REVIEW, supra note 61, at 12-13. 
Luxembourg is a small country with a constitutional monarchy and a unicameral legislature. 
The Chamber of Deputies comprises sixty members who have been elected for a five-year 
term. The Grand Duke, as Head of State, “promulgates laws and issues regulations and decrees 
for execution of laws.” International law, including European Union law, “takes precedence 
over domestic law, including the Luxembourg Constitution.” Id. 
226.  See Hamish Boland-Rudder, Luxleaks A ‘Game-Changer’ For Europe: Finance 
Minister, INT’L CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Dec. 22, 2014, 3:00 PM), 
http://www.icij.org/blog/2014/12/luxleaks-game-changer-europe-finance-minister. 
227.  See Mischo & Kerger, supra note 225, at 1200. 
228.  Id. at 1197-8. 
229.  Id. at 1200. 
230.  Press Release, Luxembourg Committed to Establishing a Level Playing Field With 
Regard To Transparency On Tax Rulings; Provides Commission With Requested Information, 
Ministère des Finances, (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.mf.public.lu/actualites/2014/12/lux_
rulings_181214/. 
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perspective, and cannot be limited to one country’s regulatory 
framework and practice.”231 The Commission has requested that all 
Member States provide information about their tax ruling practice as 
well as a list of all companies receiving a tax ruling during the period 
ranging from 2010 to 2013.232 The commissioner for competition 
policy, Margrethe Vestager, declared: 
We need a full picture of the tax rulings practices in the EU to 
identify if and where competition in the Single Market is being 
distorted through selective tax advantages. We will use the 
information received in today’s enquiry as well as the knowledge 
gained from our ongoing investigations to combat tax avoidance 
and fight for fair tax competition.233 
This demand complements the “recent calls for more 
transparency of tax rulings” by OECD and the G20. In addition, 
President Juncker committed to a legal proposal regarding the 
automatic exchange of information on tax rulings in December 
2014.234 
On March 18, 2015, Commissioner Moscovici presented the 
Commission’s package of tax transparency measures designed to 
address “corporate tax avoidance and harmful tax competition in the 
EU.”235 The Commission points out that the aggressive tax planning 
engaged in by some MNCs has been aided by the tax rulings issued 
by certain tax administrations especially when there is a lack of 
transparency.236 Thus, information exchange on advance cross-border 
rulings and advance pricing arrangements “that potentially affect the 
tax bases of more than one Member State requires a common and 
compulsory approach.”237 The Directive on Administrative 
Cooperation (“DAC”)238 had previously provided for mandatory 
spontaneous exchange of information between Member States in 
                                                                                                             
231.  Sebag, supra note 4 (quoting an e-mailed statement by Luxembourg Finance 
Minister Pierre Gramegna). 
232.  See Press Release, Enquiry on Tax Ruling Practice, supra note 203.  
233.  Id. 
234.  See id. 
235.  Press Release, IP/15/4610, Combatting Corporate Tax Avoidance: Commission 
Presents Tax Transparency Package (Mar. 18, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
15-4610_en.htm. 
236.  See Commission Proposal, supra note 22, at 2. 
237.  Id. at 4. 
238.  See 2011 DAC, supra note 67, at 1. 
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cases where the competent authority of one Member State had 
knowledge that there might be a loss of tax revenue in another 
Member State from such cross-border tax rulings.239 However, the 
discretion given to the issuing Member State to determine which other 
Member States should be informed led to a negligible exchange of 
information of advance cross-border tax rulings and advance pricing 
arrangements.240 In fact, De Masi, a German member of the European 
Parliament who testified in Deltour’s defense in the case before the 
Luxembourg District Court, asserts that Luxembourg violated this 
Directive by not exchanging some of these tax rulings with the 
relevant Member States.241 
The European Council adopted the Directive to Exchange Cross-
Border Rulings on December 8, 2015, stating that an increase in 
transparency was urgently required.242 The Directive requires 
mandatory automatic exchange on a biannual basis of basic 
information on a standardized form with respect to cross-border tax 
rulings and advance pricing agreements between all EU Member 
States and also with the Commission.243 Concerns over the potential 
for disclosure of commercial, industrial, or professional secrets seem 
unwarranted due to the limited nature of the information that is 
required to be shared with all Member States through access to a 
secure central directory.244 The form would include the following 
information: (1) the taxpayer (unless an individual) and any group of 
companies to which it belongs; (2) a summary of the content of the 
advance cross-border ruling or APA, including a description of the 
                                                                                                             
239.  See Commission Proposal, supra note 22, at 7-8. 
240.  See id. at 3, 8 (“There is, in practice, little information exchange between Member 
States on their advance tax rulings or transfer pricing arrangements even where these have an 
impact on other countries.”). 
241.  See Teri Sprackland, Luxembourg Broke EU Law, LUXLEAKS Trial Witness 
Says, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY (Apr. 28, 2016), 2016 WTD 82-1. 
242.  See Directive to Exchange Cross-Border Rulings, supra note 23, at pmbl. 
(“[R]ulings concerning tax–driven structures have, in certain cases, led to a low level of 
taxation of …income in the country issuing…the advance ruling and left artificially low 
amounts of income to be taxed in any other countries involved.”). 
243.  See id. art. 8a (1) (the “competent authority of a Member State … shall, by 
automatic exchange, communicate information” about defined tax rulings that they issue or 
amend after December 31, 2016 “to the competent authorities of all other Member States” and 
the Commission; id. art. 8a(2) (this obligation extends to rulings issued in the five years before 
January 1, 2017, the date on which the Directive takes effect, which are still valid on the date 
of entry into force of the Directive.). 
244.  See id. at pmbl. (9), (12), (14), (19). 
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relevant business activities or transactions; (3) the transfer price; (4) 
the identification of the other Member States affected by the ruling; 
and (5) the identification of other Member States’ legal entities 
affected by the ruling.245 Member States must rely on exchange of 
information on request procedures to obtain additional information, 
such as the full text of advance cross-border tax ruling or the APA.246 
The United States confronted a similar transparency issue in the 
1970s when the publisher Tax Analysts sued to obtain disclosure of 
private letter rulings (“PLRs”).247 There were concerns over the 
unfairness of the development of private legal libraries for tax rulings 
by a few law firms and the major public accounting firms, which gave 
them “exclusive rights to IRS’ ruling position on dynamic areas of tax 
law.”248 This dispute was resolved by the enactment of section 6110 
in 1976,249 which requires, with certain exceptions, that the text of any 
written determination the IRS issues and the related background 
documents must be made available for public inspection.250 A written 
determination includes any ruling or determination letter.251 Before 
making the documents available, the IRS must delete sensitive 
information, such as identifying details, trade secrets, and confidential 
commercial and financial information.252 The Internal Revenue Code 
(“I.R.C.” or “Code”) also specifies the administrative and judicial 
remedies available to resolve disputes over the scope of the 
information disclosed.253 Furthermore, the US Congress has exempted 
other statutory exclusions, such as return information, from these 
                                                                                                             
245.  See id. art. 8a(6)(a)-(k). 
246.  See id. art. 8a(10). 
247.  See Michael J. McIntyre, The Case for Public Disclosure of Advance Rulings on 
Transfer Pricing Methodologies, 2 TAX NOTES INT’L 1127, 1129 (1990). 
248.  Rob Marvin, Transfer Pricing: BNA Files Lawsuit to Force IRS to Release 
Redacted APAs, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Feb. 28, 1996; see also McIntyre, supra note 247. 
Prior to the release of PLRs to the general public, the “rulings comprised the hidden tax law of 
the United States.” Id. Available, however, to large firms in DC and New York, this access 
“gave the privileged firms an advantage in practicing before the IRS.” Id. 
249.  See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976). 
250.  See I.R.C. § 6110(a). 
251.  See I.R.C. § 6110(b)(1); I.R.C. § 6110(b)(2) (defining ‘‘background file 
documents’’ as any written material submitted in support of the request as well as any 
communications between the IRS and persons outside the IRS concerning such written 
determination that occur before the IRS issues the determination). 
252.  See I.R.C. § 6110(c). 
253.  See I.R.C. § 6110(f). 
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public disclosure requirements.254 Return information includes any 
part of a written determination or background file that is not disclosed 
under section 6110.255 The IRS released 1,756 redacted PLRs in 2010, 
1,503 in 2011, 1,369 in 2012,  1,256 in 2013, 1,599 in 2014, and 
1,119 in 2015.256 
In 1991, the IRS issued a revenue procedure with details for 
obtaining a special type of private letter ruling known as an advance 
pricing agreement (“APA”).257 An APA “is a binding agreement 
between the Service and a taxpayer regarding future transfer pricing 
in international transactions.”258 The APA program focuses on 
identifying the appropriate transfer pricing methodology in order to 
resolve international transfer pricing issues prior to the filing of the 
corporate tax return. Taxpayers voluntarily participate in the APA 
program by submitting among other items: detailed tax and financial 
information; an economic study of the general industry pricing 
practices; a functional analysis; and a list of the taxpayer’s 
competitors to the IRS for consideration.259 The IRS engages in an 
extensive analysis of the taxpayer’s functions and risks. 
As private libraries of APAs started developing in the major 
public accounting and law firms, the Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. 
(“BNA”) filed in federal court for the release of the transfer pricing 
methodologies approved in these APAs on February 27, 1996 under 
the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), or under section 6110.260 
                                                                                                             
254.  See I.R.C. § 6110(c)(3). 
255.   See I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2)(B) (“The term ‘return information’ means . . . any part of 
any written determination or any background file document relating to such written 
determination (as such terms are defined in section 6110(b)) which is not open to public 
inspection under section 6110”). 
256.  These findings are based on an original Lexis search, on file with author. 
257.  See Rev. Proc. 1991-22, 1991-1 C.B. 526 (this revenue ruling has since been 
superseded). 
258.  JOEL D. KUNTZ & ROBERT J. PERONI, U.S. INT’L TAXATION, ¶ A3.11[13][a] 
(2015) (Westlaw (Advance Pricing Agreements (Private Letter Rulings)) [hereinafter KUNTZ 
& PERONI ]. A bilateral APA is an advance agreement establishing an approved transfer 
pricing methodology entered into among the taxpayer, the IRS, and a foreign tax authority. 
259.  See id. at ¶ A3.11[13][b] (agreement procedure). 
260.  See Marvin, supra note 247 (noting that BNA Vice President and Executive Editor 
Kathleen D. Gill stated: “We hope to win the release of the transfer pricing methodologies 
with the taxpayer-specific information redacted from the released APAs, much like private 
letter rulings.”); see also Bureau of National Affairs Inc. v. Commissioner, No. 96-CV376 (DC 
DC), filed on February 27, 1996; Bureau of National Affairs Inc. v. Commissioner, Nos. 96–
376, 96–2820 (DC DC) and 96–1473 (D.D.C.). 
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Because APAs are prospective in application, BNA contended that 
they are not return information261: “Thus, at the time they are entered 
into, they do not relate to the determination of the existence, or 
possible existence, of liability or amount thereof [. . .].”262 BNA also 
argued that the development of a public library of transfer pricing 
methodologies would be beneficial to all taxpayers by stating that 
“[t]axpayers will be able to compare the approved methods and 
design their own APAs based on IRS’ past practice, thus expediting 
the approval of APAs to the benefit both of taxpayers and IRS.”263 
FOIA specifies the information that a federal agency must 
disclose264 but also provides an exemption for items specifically 
exempted from disclosure by a statute.265 Under section 6103, returns 
and return information are confidential and cannot be disclosed unless 
authorized by the Code. The Code defines return information broadly 
to include: 
[A] taxpayer’s identity, any other data, received by, recorded by, 
prepared by, furnished to, or collected by the Secretary with 
respect to a return or with respect to the determination of the 
existence, or possible existence, of liability (or the amount 
thereof) of any person under this title for any tax [. . .].266  
Thus, returns and return information that section 6103 deems 
confidential are exempt from disclosure under FOIA. 
The IRS had taken the position that all “information received or 
generated as part of the APA process pertains to a taxpayer’s liability 
                                                                                                             
261.  See Tax Management Portfolio No. 890 Foreign Income Transfer Pricing: 
Alternative Practical Strategies, 890 TM A107 (2006) [hereinafter Tax Management Portfolio]. 
262.  STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., GEN. EXPLANATION OF 
TAX LEGIS. ENACTED IN THE 106TH CONGR. (Comm. Print 2001), http://www.jct.gov/s-2-
01.pdf [hereinafter JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX 
LEGISLATION]. 
263.  Marvin, supra note 248 (noting that BNA Vice President and Executive Editor 
Kathleen D. Gill stated BNA filed the complaint after exhausting its administrative options to 
obtain the transfer pricing methodologies, which multinational corporations use in part to 
determine how much income from intercompany transactions will be attributed to the United 
States for tax purposes and how much will be attributed to jurisdictions abroad). 
264.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (2009). 
265.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (2009). An agency is not required to disclose matters that 
are “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title) 
provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a 
manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for 
withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld . . . “ Id. 
266.  I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2)(A) (2015). 
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and therefore was return information . . . subject to section 6103’s 
restrictions on the dissemination of returns and return information.”267 
However, in 1999, “the IRS conceded that APAs are ‘rulings’” and 
agreed to their release.268 The January 1999 notice stated that 
disclosure under “section 6110 will fully protect the confidentiality 
interests . . . while helping taxpayers better understand the issues 
involved in APAs and increasing public confidence in the fairness of 
the tax system as a whole.”269 
Perceived concerns over the insufficiency of the section 6110 
procedures to protect their confidential information led some 
organizations and corporations to approach the US Congress for 
legislation to block this release.270 By amending section 6103 to 
include APAs in the definition of return information,271 “the IRS 
cannot publicly disclose an APA or the information, data, and 
documents related to an APA.”272 Because section 6110 is the 
exclusive means for the public to view IRS written determinations,273 
the public also cannot use FOIA to obtain APAs. As APAs and the 
related background information are excluded from the definition of 
“written determinations,” the public inspection rules do not apply.274 
The legislation does, however, require the IRS to publish an 
annual report that includes “information about the structure, 
composition, and operation of the APA program” but no information 
                                                                                                             
267.  JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION, 
supra note 262, at 34 n.32 (citing Rev. Proc. 91–22, sec. 11, 1991–1 C.B. 526, 534 and Rev. 
Proc. 96–53, sec.12, 1996–2 C.B. 375, 386); see also I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2)(A). 
268.  JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION, 
supra note 262, at 34. 
269.  I.R.S. News Release IR-1999-05 (Jan. 11, 1999), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/
ir-99-05.pdf. 
270.  See id.; see also KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 258, at ¶ A3.11[13][c] (discussing 
Policy Considerations Regarding Public Disclosure). 
271.  See Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 106-170, 
§ 521(a), 113 Stat. 1925 (1999) (adding I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2)(C) and amending I.R.C. § 
6110(b)(1)) [hereinafter Work Improvement Act]. By adding section 6103(b)(2)(C), the term 
“return information” includes any APA and any background information related to such an 
agreement. Tax Management Portfolio, supra note 261, at A107. 
272.  Martin A. Sullivan, How To Decode APAs And Still Keep A Secret, 21 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 1250, 1250 (2000); see also Work Incentives Improvement Act, § 521(a), 113 Stat. 1925 
(1999). 
273.  See I.R.C. § 6110(m) (2012). 
274.  JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION, 
supra note 262, at 35. 
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that would identify a particular taxpayer.275 The reports must also 
contain general descriptions of the methodologies and sources of 
comparables as well as statistics on the time to complete the process 
and the number of APA applications filed, executed pending, and 
renewed.276 The most recent report “describes the experience, 
structure, and activities of the APMA Program during calendar year 
2015. It does not provide guidance regarding the application of the 
arm’s length standard.”277 
In 2012, the APA Program was transferred from the “Office of 
Chief Counsel to the Office of Transfer Pricing Operations within the 
Large Business and International Division of the IRS” and merged 
“with the United States Competent Authority staff responsible for 
transfer pricing cases” to form the Advanced Pricing and Mutual 
Agreement (“APMA”) Program.278 Thus, the team developing the 
IRS position in a bilateral or multilateral case and concluding the 
APA with the taxpayer is also responsible for obtaining an agreement 
on the case with the respective treaty partner(s). This single APA 
team eliminates inefficiencies and decreases resolution time with the 
treaty partner(s).279 The current procedures can be found in Rev. Proc. 
2015-41 and stress a preference for bilateral and multilateral APAs 
over unilateral APAs.280 
The APMA program has concluded “more than 11,000 
unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral agreements since 1991.”281 
Unlike the private letter rulings, these rulings are not being released to 
the public. Given the global movement toward tax transparency, the 
LuxLeaks, and the European Union’s State aid investigations into 
various multinationals transfer pricing arrangements, it is time to 
reexamine this policy and determine whether the public should have 
full access to the rulings (sanitized of course to remove all names and 
                                                                                                             
275.  Tax Management Portfolio, supra note 261, at A108; see also Work Improvement 
Act, § 521(b), 113 Stat. 1925-27 (1999). The IRS issued the first such report in 2000; I.R.S. 
Announcement 2000-35, 2000-16 I.R.B. 922. 
276.  See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION, 
supra note 262, at 35-6. 
277.  I.R.S. Announcement 2016-12, 2016-16 I.R.B. 1 (Announcement and Report 
Concerning Advance Pricing Agreements) [hereinafter I.R.S. Announcement on Advance 
Pricing Agreements]. 
278.  See id. at 2. 
279.  See id. 
280.  See Rev. Proc. 2015-41, 2015-35 I.R.B. 263. 
281.  I.R.S. Announcement 2015-11, 2015-15 I.R.B. 883, 884. 
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confidential data). Professor McIntyre argued back in 1990 as the 
APA program was being formulated that a “need for some secrecy, 
however, does not justify total secrecy.”282 
The previous arguments for releasing the APAs to the public are 
still valid today. Taxpayer guidance such as this is imperative for a 
tax system that depends on voluntary compliance. The IRS should be 
able to redact enough information so that the taxpayer cannot be 
identified, while still releasing a version that is meaningful to other 
taxpayers.283 Most of the taxpayers involved in the APMA program 
are publicly traded corporations that already submit significant 
amounts of information to the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission. These agreements are withheld “from the public while 
some taxpayers proclaim to the tax press that they have obtained such 
agreements.”284 Releasing the advance pricing agreements will build 
confidence in the APMA program by demonstrating that particular 
taxpayers are not getting favored treatment.285 Similar to the rulings 
exchange system being established in the European Union, the 
disclosure should have a positive effect on the tax arrangements being 
approved. 
Martin Sullivan has stated that with “the same effort required of 
other agencies complying with [FOIA]—Congress could have 
provided the public with access to valuable information contained in 
APAs and still protected taxpayer confidentiality.”286 Instead, the IRS 
is expending substantial taxpayer resources to help single taxpayers. 
The user fees for APA requests have historically been set at fifty 
percent of the government’s estimated cost of completing the APA.287 
The new revenue procedure has increased these fees to approximately 
fifty-four percent of the estimated costs. Not until 2020 will the fees 
cover the total estimated cost of approving an APA.288 The need for 
                                                                                                             
282.  McIntyre, supra note 247. 
283.  See KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 258, at ¶ A3.11[13][c] (discussing Policy 
Considerations Regarding Public Disclosure). 
284.  Id. 
285.  See id. 
286.  Sullivan, supra note 272, at 1250. 
287.  See Kristen A. Parillo & Marie Sapirie, Final APA, Competent Authority Guidance 
Hikes User Fees, TAX NOTES INT’L, Aug. 17, 2015, (statement of Varley). 
288.  See id. (“Our plan is to raise the fee incrementally over the next five years, so by 
2020 the fees will cover the total estimated cost”). 
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efficiency strongly suggests release of these APA agreements so as to 
allow the substance of the agreements to help multiple taxpayers. 
The fact that the burden of proof is on the government agency to 
justify nondisclosure and that administrative difficulties cannot justify 
nondisclosure are important FOIA principles.289 Tremendous taxpayer 
resources are being expended to operate the APMA program without 
all taxpayers benefitting from the information, a valuable and growing 
body of tax law. Furthermore, the United States does not have State 
aid rules like the European Union to regulate companies gaining a 
competitive advantage over each other. More transparency in the 
APMA process would ensure such a result. 
CONCLUSION 
On April 4, 2016, the International Consortium of Investigative 
Journalists announced their access to the “Panama Papers,” 11.5 
million documents comprising forty years of emails, bank accounts 
and client records from the Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca.290 
This latest public disclosure reveals the offshore accounts of 
individuals and corporations from over 200 countries and 
demonstrates that the movement toward global transparency is 
inevitable. The Panama Papers are also a powerful reminder that 
transparency matters greatly in the war on tax evasion. 
The public and the press, however, often fail to distinguish 
between tax avoidance and tax evasion, thus governments are 
scrambling to find further ways to curtail offshore tax avoidance as 
well as tax evasion. The European Union has reacted much more 
quickly than the United States. For example, in addition to sharing 
information between the EU tax authorities as previously discussed, 
the European Commission has also proposed a requirement for the 
public disclosure of key information by large multinationals.291 After 
the public outcry following the Panama Papers revelations, the 
Commission tweaked this proposal to require country-specific 
                                                                                                             
289.  See Sullivan, supra note 272, at 1251. 
290.  Giant Leak of Offshore Financial Records Exposes Global Array of Crime and 
Corruption, INT’L CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS, https://panamapapers.   
icij.org/20160403-panama-papers-global-overview.html. 
291. See European Commission Press Release, IP/16/1349 (April 12, 2016). 
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reporting for tax haven jurisdictions in the final proposed directive.292 
Furthermore, the G5 countries of France, Germany, Italy, Spain and 
the United Kingdom have pledged to develop a global initiative for 
the automatic exchange of beneficial ownership information stating 
that “identifying the ultimate beneficial owner behind corporate 
structures is [the] key to fight[ing] tax evasion, money laundering, 
and elicit[ing] finance effectively.”293 The US Treasury Department 
has proposed regulations that require foreign-owned single–member 
limited liability companies to disclose beneficial ownership 
information.294 
As discussed in Part I, the Obama Administration has 
acknowledged the importance of the information received from the 
US information exchange partners to the IRS enforcement efforts 
against offshore tax evasion. The President has repeatedly proposed 
that US financial institutions be required to report to the IRS the same 
information on nonresidents currently required of FFIs with respect to 
US account holders. Only if such legislation is adopted will the IRS 
be able to exchange equivalent information to be used by the US 
information exchange partners in their efforts to address the tax 
evasion by their residents. As detailed in Part II, with respect to 
corporate tax avoidance, legislation is also necessary to bring more 
transparency to the APMA process. The current breakdown of the US 
legislative process has not allowed the United States to participate 
fully in the global movement toward transparency after having been 
the leading proponent of this movement with the enactment of 
FATCA. 
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